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Loyalty and the sense of self, a theoretical argument for positing a dialectic of instincts: Altruism and egoism

Maret, Wallis Reed, Ph.D.

The Wright Institute, 1987

LOYALTY AND THE SENSE OF SELF
A THEORETICAL ARGUMENT FOR POSITING A DIALECTIC OF INSTINCTS:
ALTRUISM AND EGOISM

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF

THE WRIGHT INSTITUTE

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in Psychology

By

WALLIS REED MARET
Berkeley, California
August, 1987

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FOR

JACOB

and

REBECCA ELIZABETH

August, 1987

LOYALTY AND THE SENSE OF SELF
A THEORETICAL ARGUMENT FOR POSITING A DIALECTIC OF INSTINCTS: ALTRUISM AND EGOISM

by

WALLIS REED MARET

The present paper purports to define and support the thesis
of a pro-social instinct. It defines that instinct as the
infant's drive toward relatedness, the infant's search for
the other from which also stems those unlearned universal
tendencies to behave under certain circumstances in ways
that benefit other members of one's group. It understands
the human infant as essentially social in nature, as having
a psychological deep structure which gives meaning to reality,
allowing the human infant to develop in such ways as to per-
ceive himself as essentially belonging to and acknowledging
himself in relation to others. At the same time this deep
structure so constructs the inner reality of the developing
infant so as to allow him to create personal meanings, to
interpret individually, his social, natural, and psychological
environment, his own personal relationship to his world.

Classical psychoanalytic and cognitve development theories
neither predict nor discuss the manifestations of altruistic
behavior occurring before the age of five years. It is only
recently that altruism and moral judgement have been studied
in terms of an altruistic motivational system.

An altruistic motivational system is integrated into a consistent psychodynamic theoretical model through an understanding of a basic dialectic instinct theory: autonomy cannot exist without relatedness and that each utilizes the instinctual interplay between egoism and altruism. This dialectic theory is posited as an augmentation to object relations theory and to those theories supporting an unconscious use of mental functioning and unconscious guilt as a motivational factor.

Pathology is viewed as arising out of some instinctually based conflict between one's own needs and the needs of others as these needs are perceived by the individual. In other words, the individual fears for his own psychic safety and is genuinely concerned for the other's welfare. Loyalty to pathogenic parental identifications based upon one's unconscious guilt is seen as a basic factor in psychopathology.

In this theoretical frame, the work of psychotherapy is not the uncovering of egoistic impulses and motivation, but becomes rather a reintegration of the altruistic and egoistic motivational systems.

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CHAPTER   I

INTRODUCTION

The long term effect of crippling family loyalties upon

individuals has been a problem addressed by family thera-

pists and psychoanalysts alike, although each might concep-

tualize and treat this problem quite differently. Interestingly,

for any substantial discussion of loyalty in psychothera-

peutic terms, one needs to look at the family therapy liter-

ature. Although my attempt in this work is to place the

concept of loyalty as emanating from a a pro-social instinct,

into the psychoanalytic literature, I will first consult

briefly the family therapy literature here in the Intro-

duction for a brief description and understanding of the

problem. My justification for this is based upon my under-

standing of an object relations theory which places the

individual in a relational context. Greenberg and Mitchell,

Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory (1983), discuss

the difficulty Freud encountered in attempting to integrate

the relational aspects of object relations within the drive/

structure framework. Freud's theory clearly de-emphasized

the complex relational interplay among family members. Yet,

it is this relational context as well as the internalized

symbolization of that relationship which forms the foundation

for a sense of self and the individual's view of the world.

It is through the activity of relatedness that the self

is constituted. In other words, it is out of the relationship

2.

with the other and through the responses of the other that
the self is born. Early actual object relationships then,
are the essence of the development of the personality and
the self, fused with the internal biological and psychical
responses and recorded representations of these individual
responses.

The family therapy literature abounds with the difficul-
ties of unraveling these invisible, but sometimes, psycho-
logically crippling loyalties. The work of Nagy (1960).
in particular, sets forth a system which he describes as
transgenerational accountability. This is a system founded
upon a child's innate capacity for understanding the world
in terms of loyalty, justice and trust (as each is defined
by his particular culture). In other words, the potential
for new involvements, e.g., marriage, parenthood, career
success, has to be weighed against old unconscious obliga-
tions. These unconscious obligations can pull toward a
lasting symbiotic relationship which Nagy might define as
a pull toward a maintenance and substantiation of the
internalized object relationships. What this means is that
the original primary relationship is maintained in substance
as well as affect (through idealization) rather than trans-
formed through symbolization and sublimation into a further-
ing capacity for love and desire in new, other object

3.

relationships.[1.] The effects of this symbiotic relation-

ship, then, cripples rather than provides an ethical and

behavioral structure of being in the world.

Although Nagy posits a dialectic theory of relationships,

that is, the individual is partner to a dialogue in a

dynamic exchange with the other or non-self,[2.] and the bulk

---

1. Freud, in his General Introduction to Psychoanalysis,
26th Lecture, recalls "narcissistic identification": "the
melancholic has indeed withdrawn his libido from the object,
but that by a process which we call 'narcissistic identifi-
cation' he has set up the object within the ego itself,
projected it onto the ego. The ego itself is then treated
as though it were the abandoned object, it suffers all the
revengeful and aggressive treatment which is designated for
the object." (1924, 1960, p 434) In the British object
relations school, Winnicott, too, describes a phenomenon akin
to what Nagy is describing. For Winnicott this is the
phenomenon wherein "longing" takes the place of "living" (1971)

2. This follows the thinking of Freudian psychoanalyst
Jacques Lacan and general linguistics theory:
"It is the I-Thou dialectic, defining the subjects by their
mutual opposition, which founds subjectivity. Consciousness
of self is only possible if it is felt in contrast to the
Thou which actualizes the concept of non-me." (Lemaire, 1970,
p53) Lemaire further explains: "The philosophy which may
be derived from the study of language will lead Lacan to
promote the thesis that birth into language and the utiliza-
tion of the symbol produce a disjunction between the lived
experience and the sign which represents it. This disjunction
will become greater over the years, language being above all
the organ of communication of reflection upon a lived experi-
ence which it is often not able to go beyond. Always seeking
to 'rationalize' and to 'repress' the lived experience,
reflection will eventually become profoundly divergent from
the lived experience. In this sense we can say, with Lacan,
that the appearance of language is simultaneous with the
primal repression which constitutes the unconscious." Thus,
in one simultaneous moment, the self, the unconscious, and
language are born.

4.

of this dynamic is within the unconscious which is implied
or manifested through the behavior of individuals toward one
another, he does not offer any substantial theoretical frame
for the important role which loyalty plays in his understand-
ing of human relationships and subsequent pathology. In other
words, Nagy does not answer the question as to why the indi-
vidual child should be so disposed toward an unconscious
loyalty which sometimes involves self-sacrifice (in the
respect that the individual is seen by himself and others as
incapable of forming new, lasting, satisfying relationships,
but rather remains locked into a poorly functioning, dissat-
isfying symbiotic relationship with the internalized other).
He does not offer an argument as to why any individual is
innately predisposed toward the world view which holds as
fundamental the values of loyalty, trust, and justice.

   Samuel Slipp, (1985) in the family therapy literature,
looks to object relations theory as explanation for why
and how families develop symbiotic survival patterns, wherein
autonomy is diminished and individual self-esteem is experi-
enced as dependent both upon family members as well as the
survival and integrity of the family group. Slipp explains
pathology as occurring by the fostering of varying degrees

5.

and forms of "magical thinking" which makes the child feel

responsible for the existence of others through his or her

own behavior.[3] Thus, the child's own guilt and omnipotent

destructive fantasies become reinforced, interfering with

self-esteem and self constancy - a term denoting the child's

own sense of self and of others existing within time and

space, and not vulnerable to a magical destruction by passing

feeling states of the child toward himself or others.[4]

As a result of this sense of overwhelming guilt the child

sacrifices his own autonomy and individuality in order to

preserve the family and the self. Slipp offers his synthesis

of developmental and object relations theory as explanation

and description of the intrapsychic development of the child

within the family, that is, in the context of the other, as

Nagy would describe it.

Peter Buckley, in his object relations study, describes the

bridge between the real and the internal object relationship in

the same way as Slipp proposes, the internal object is

---

3. W.D. Fairbairn, an object relations theorist, names
this human capacity experienced by children "omnipotent
culpability."
4. Libidinal object constancy presupposes the unification
of good and bad representations of the object as well as the
fusion of the libidinal and aggressive drives with which they
are cathected.(Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p 279)

6.

the manifestation of the real object:

> "The object relationsip is seen as an intrapsychic
> part of the wish or wishful fantasy (not all wishes
> are instinctual wishes, but there are also wishes
> to gain or preserve safetv). After a certain point
> in the child's development we cannot speak of a
> wish which does not have instinctual content, and
> this ideational content is, for the purpose of our
> work as psychotherapists, very often centered around
> the representation of oneself in interaction with
> the object. The object plays as important a role as
> the self in the mental representation which is part
> of the wish." (Buckley, 1986, p 283)

In other words, the content of unconscious psychic conflict

is not understood as deriving from constitutionallv derived

drive pressure and regulation, but from shifting and competing

configurations composed of relations between the self and

others.

However,although Slipp sees development occurring along

the lines of moving from the child's discovery of "I am" to

"I am responsible,"[5.] and thus, moving out of a narcissistic

position to one of concern for others, he does not fully

delineate just what the impetus for this movement is. The

psychoanalvtic literature does not provide the structure for

him to either tackle or answer this question. What the

---

5. Here, Slipps's thinking parallels, among others, that of
D. W. Winnicott, which places development of the sense of
self as 'being,' occurring before the sense of self as 'doing'
(agency). With this sense of oneself, the child moves from
treating the object ruthlesslv (without concern) to learning
to express 'ruth' toward his object. (1971)

7.

psychoanalytic literature, in particular, Freud, does

provide is an approach wherein the child becomes, through

various developmental stages, more susceptible to the limi-

tations of the reality principle. This approach will be

discussed in Chapter II.

The present study will review the psychoanalytic liter-

ature tracing the concepts of human instinct, attachment,

relatedness, object relations, and altruism through the

works of Freud, Balint, Bowlby, Klein, Fairbairn, Winni-

cott, and Guntrip in Chapter II. Here in the psychoanalytic

literature one will see the progression from understanding

attachment as purely libidinal drive reduction of the

autonomous ego cathecting an object, through to an under-

standing of object relatedness (in the British school)

which places an emerging sense of self developing through

the sense of relatedness to the other. This relationship

then becomes in the literature fundamental, albeit, uncon-

scious, to the self. The acknowledgement of the other is

innate, not learned, not thrust upon the self by a restrict-

ing society, and not confined to the restricting internal

(intrapsychic) forces of the super-ego.

Chapter III will present the theory of Michael Friedman,

in the "Reconceptualization of Guilt." Friedman extrapolates

8.

from psychoanalytic theory the elements for positing a pro-social instinct. A pro-social instinct was explicitly rejected by Freud, however, in <u>Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego</u>. Friedman states that this pro-social instinct exists in addition to the self-preservation and sexual instincts. The pro-social instinct is innate, as is our capacity for language and for self-preservation. These instincts are universal and emanate from a deep structure: they are universal tendencies to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances. These tendencies exist before learning, in the sense that they are the basis for the capacity to learn the rules of behaving and knowing about behaving. For a developed explanation of the instinct as deep structure, the work of Thomas Ogden will be presented. He reinterprets instinct theory (1985) following the model of a deep structure as defined by Noam Chomsky. (1957, 1968)

Friedman states that the evidence for a theory of pro-social instinct is consistent with the theory of natural selection as evidenced by the universality of such tendencies that cannot be adequately explained and accounted for by the socialization process alone. This theory obviously challenges the basic tenet of drive theory which holds that an individual's deepest motivation is by definition egoistic whether in the service of the self preservation or sexual instincts

9.

or, as in later Freudian theory, in the service of Nirvana
- the regressive pull toward death - as well. An individual's
altruistic motivation can only be a result of sublimation or
defenses against this egoistic motivation. Friedman attempts
to exorcise the concept of altruism from the moral realm
(religious and philosophical relegation) and place it in the
realm of biology, science, and hence psychology. Friedman's
thesis of unconscious guilt being founded upon the pro-social
instinct will be discussed.

Chapter IV will review cognitive and social learning
theories in psychology as they apply to and study the concept
of pro-social behavior and moral development in humans with
their beginnings in the early empathic distress responses
observed in infants. Nancy Eisenberg's work (1982, 1986) and
Martin Hoffman's theoretical model (1982, 1984) will form the
basis of this presentation.

In Chapter V the attempt will be to integrate the many
theories previously presented into a consistent psycho-
dynamic model of the individual through an understanding of
a basic dialectic instinct theory: autonomy cannot exist
without relatedness and that each utilizes the instinctual
interplay between egoism and altruism. Thus, it appears that
the individual is so structured as to utilize an interplay
between these basic instincts as the basis for his sense of
self in relation to others and to the world.

10.

The literature on pre-oedipal guilt and loyalty, unconscious motivational forces based upon the instinctual capacity for altruistic motivation will be presented. Here, the work of Friedman, Sampson, and Weiss will be reviewed. The interplay between altruism and egoism will be posited as an augmentation to object relations theory and the concept of unconscious guilt. Pathology is said to occur when this interplay between altruism and egoism breaks down, when an individual consistently and traumatically perceives his own needs and desires as either fused with or separate from the needs and desires of others.

The implications for clinical intervention will be discussed. Pathology may be viewed as often arising out of some conflict between one's own needs and the needs of others as they are perceived by the child (individual). This conflict is experienced in all the many varieties of neurotic and psychotic behavior in the general pattern of conscious anxiety, creating defense, which is regulated by unconscious guilt. There may occur as a result disturbances in conscience, empathy, and altruism, as well as an excessive dependence upon the environment for any sense of fulfillment. What follows then for the individual is a rigidly perceived sense of self and view of the world as always separate or always fused with the needs and goals of others as they are perceived by the self.

11.

Therapy in this case is not a therapy of solely uncovering defenses against egoistic and infantile drives, but rather of locating the sources for this pathological and unconscious guilt in the beliefs and perceptions of the individual - in how the child senses that his own egoistic impulses and drive toward autonomy (would have) will destroy or damage those close to him. Sampson and Weiss's clinical data confirm this hypothesis which they have compiled in their recent work, The Psychoanalytic Process. (1986)

Toward the larger picture, there will be a discussion of the zealous but sometimes poorly informed and misplaced perceptions and attempts by the psychotherapy profession at ushering individuals along in their development toward what has come to be called autonomy and individuation, and in that process losing sight of, and even the language for, that which forms the basis for altruism, for a shared conscience, for committment, for that loyalty which does not destroy, for that autonomy which does not isolate. The work of Bellah, et al., eloquently describes this present phenomenon of the helping profession in Habits of the Heart. (1985) The reader is referred to this work for a fuller understanding of the sociological implications of the culture's emphasis on egoism and autonomy.

12.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The literature clearly delineates a move from understanding
instinct as constitutionally determined drives and their
vicissitudes to one of instinct as genetically programmed
capacities individually realized within a social and
human context.

FREUD:
The Two Instinct Theories

The concept of instinct and its role in creating and
determining human behavior has undergone many changes since
Freud's early discussion of instinct theory or drive theory.
Over the course of his work, Freud himself had redefined his
basic beliefs of instinct.[1] In addition to Freud's own
development and redefinition regarding his instinct theory,
there is in the psychoanalytic community today, considerable
controversy regarding the different interpretations of the
concept of instinct. The English translations make no dis-
tinction between the two German words, "instinkt" and "trieb."
Both words were used by Freud, but were not used by him
interchangeably. According to Laplanche and Pontalis (1973),
"trieb" is of germanic origin and retains overtones suggestive
of pressure (Trieben: to push). "Instinkt" in its Latin
origins derives from push as well but has come to connote
something different from "trieb." (p 214)

---

1. So strong was Freud's belief in the evolutionary process
of his theory that, as recounted by Joan Riviere, herself a
psychoanalyst who translated some of the writings of Freud
from the German into the English, when she was questioning
him on particular points in The Ego and The Id (1927),
Freud, exasperated, replied to her: "In thirty years it
will all be obsolete anyway." (Guntrip, 1971)

Laplanche and Pontalis list two definitions for Instinct:

> 1. Traditionally a hereditary behavior pattern
> peculiar to an animal species, varying little from
> one member of this species to another and unfolding
> in accordance with a temporal scheme which is
> generally resistant to change and apparently geared
> to a purpose.
> 2. Term generally accepted by English speaking
> psychoanalytic authors as a rendering of the German
> 'trieb': dynamic process consisting in a pressure
> (charge of energy, motricity factor) which directs
> the organism towards an aim. According to Freud, an
> instinct has its SOURCE in a bodily stimulus, its AIM
> is to eliminate the state of tension obtaining as
> the instinctual source, and it is in the OBJECT, or
> thanks to it, that the instinct may achieve its aim.
> (1973, p 214)

The main distinction for Freud, between the two concepts

seems to be that 'trieb' (which was first introduced in

the literature in 1905, in Three Essays on the Theory of

Sexuality) does not, as does 'instinkt,' account for those

"inherited mental formations which) exist in the human

being." (Freud, SE 14, p 195) Instead Freud attributed

"that hereditary, genetically acquired factor in mental life"

as constituting "primal phantasies." (Freud, SE 12, p 120)

In the same essay, (SE 12) Freud addressed the question of

whether instinct is a psychical energy or a somatic force.

He said that it is "lying on the frontier between the mental

and the physical. In other words, the instinct has its

source in organic phenomena generating inescapable tension;

and at the same time, by virtue of its aim and its objects

to which it becomes attached, the instinct undergoes a

"vicissisitude that is essentially psychical in nature."

(SE 17, p 108)

Freud introduces the notion of a representative of the soma within the psyche. In this way the relationship is to be understood not as one of causality but by analogy, similar to that between delegate and mandator. Psyche and soma are related in this way, say Laplanche and Pontalis, so that the delegate is free to form relationships which will inevitably change the initial meaning and message of the mandator. Laplanche in <u>Life and Death in Psychoanalysis</u> defines instinct as "that which orients bodily function essential to life." (1970, 1976, p 18) It is in 1915 in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" that Freud brings together an overall definition of the instincts comprising its psychological aspects: pressure, source, object, and aim.

In <u>An Outline of Psychoanalysis</u> in 1940 (SE23, p 148), Freud presents the instinct as the "psychical represenative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind." Thus, a local biological stimulus finds its delegation, its "representation, in psychical life as a drive." (Laplanche, 1970, p 12) Anika Lemaire, in discussing instinct as lying between the psyche and soma writes:

>"Between need and desire, Freud introduces
>the term instinct.
>The instinct differs from the simple organic
>need in that it introduces an erotic quality
>and thus from the outset it is inscribed in
>the domaine specific to psychoanalysis.

16.

> "The instinct is a constant force of a
> biological, organic, (and not psychical)
> nature which tends toward the suppression
> of any state of tension.
> It belongs to the psychical apparatus, be
> it conscious or unconscious, only through
> the intermediary of ideational represent-
> ative," that is, desire. (1970, 1977, p 101)

A major characteristic of Freudian metapsychology is
that of the dualistic instinctual theory: it is the dualism
which accounts for the tension and conflict and of a
combination of forces - ultimately instinctual in origin -
which exert a certain pressure. In Freud's writing, dynamic
is used to characterize the unconscious, in so far as a
permanent pressure is maintained there (in the unconscious)
which necessitates a contrary force, operating on an equally
permanent basis to stop the initial pressure and its sym-
bolic meaning from reaching consciousness. In "A Note on
the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis," Freud describes the
dynamic unconscious:

> "It designates not only latent ideas in
> general, but especially ideas with a certain
> dynamic character, ideas keeping apart from
> consciousness in spite of their intensity
> and activity. (SE 13, p 262)

Although the unconscious conflict is manifest by unconscious
ideas in conflict, the "psychical conflict" has its ultimate
basis in an instinctual dualism. (Laplanche and Pontalis,
1973, p 126)

17.

The first dualism evoked by Freud is that between the
sexual instincts and ego instinct, or instincts of self-
preservation. This was in 1905 in <u>Three Essays on the
Theory of Sexuality</u>. For Freud, these latter instincts
are the great needs or functions that are indispensible
for the preservation of the individual. This dualism was
postulated by Freud in order to account for the psychical
conflict within which the ego derives the essential part
of the energy it needs for defense against sexuality from
the instinct of self-preservation.

In the same essay Freud introduced the concept of "component
instincts" which theoretically maintains the dualistic
tension between the sexual and the ego instincts while at
the same time acknowledging the dependence of the sexual
upon the non-sexual, vital functions. This particular
dualism was not totally satisfactory for Freud it would seem.
In the 26th lecture in <u>A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis</u>,
Freud posed the question,

> "You want to know why ... I insist upon
> distinguishing between libido and interest,
> sexual instincts and ego instincts, while
> the observations are satisfactorily explained
> by assuming a single uniform energy which is
> freely mobile, can invest either object or ego,
> and can serve the purpose of the one as well
> as the other?" (Freud, 1924, p 420)

18.

Later in this same essay he discussed the distinction

between the two instincts - ego and sexual:

> For the sexual function is the only function
> of a living organism which extends beyond the
> individual and secures its connection with its
> species ... Quite peculiar metabolic processes
> different from all others, are probably required
> in order to preserve a position of the individual's
> life as a disposition for posterity." Freud seeks
> to trace "the origin to a fundamental situation
> in which the sexual instincts, or - less exactly -
> in which the ego in its capacity of independent
> individual organism had entered into opposition
> with itself in its other capacity as a member of
> a series of generations. Such a dissociation
> perhaps only exists in man ... The excessive
> development of libido and the rich elaboration
> of his mental life (perhaps directly made possible
> by it) seem to constitute the conditions
> which give rise to a conflict of this kind."
> Freud, 1924, p 420)

Although this formulation of the instinctual conflict is

the basis for the present thesis here presented, Freud,

in his major works, did not fully consider this issue nor

develop an adequate theoretical explanation for this often

and easily observed phenomenon. Rather, he relied upon

such understanding which he had already developed. After

the introduction of the concept of narcissism (1914) by Freud

the distinction between these two kinds of instinct - the

sexual and the ego instincts - tends to disappear and be

replaced by an explanation of libido in terms of its definition

by object choice: self or other. This explanation then gives

rise to what Freud considered a growing tendency toward a

19.

theory of instinctual monism. Freud moved away from this

tendency in his theory by positing a new instinctual dualism

which he introduced in <u>Beyond the Pleasure Principle</u> (1920).

He introduced life instincts and death instincts in con-

flict, thus modifying the function and location of the

instincts in the conflict. The death instinct is perhaps

one of the most controversial of Freudian concepts and by

definition the most contradictory. Laplanche and Pontalis

state that,

> "the death instincts, which are opposed
> to the life instincts, strive toward the
> reduction of tensions to zero point."
> (1970, p 97)

In other words, the goal of the death instincts is to

bring the living being back to the inorganic state. Freud

cites the concept of Nirvana (1920) as underlying the death

instinct: basically it is the principle by which the organism

seeks the absolute repose of the inorganic. On the one hand,

the death instincts represent ultimate repose and on the other,

they "tend toward self destruction, but are subsequently

turned towards the outside world in the form of aggressive

or destructive. instincts." (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1970, p 97)

   One wonders how the principle of absolute repose can account

for and be equated with all that is destructive and hateful

in human kind in the universe. What motivated Freud in

positing the death instinct, something beyond the pleasure

principle, was an attempt to explain the incidence of

20.

aggression, sadism, and masochism. Agreeably, there is

validity to grouping together aggression, sadism, masochism,

and destruction. Arguably, however, there is no observable

necessary connection between aggression and destruction and

the principle of Nirvana. This latter principle cannot be

in opposition to or beyond the pleasure principle, Eros,

LIfe. Freud writes that the Nirvana principle has the

tendency to remove internal tension and is,

> "especially on guard against increases of
> stimulation from within, which would make
> the task of living more difficult."
> (Freud, SE 17, p 57)

Aggression and destruction represent more of an increase in

psychic and somatic tension, perhaps, even a greater affir-

mation of life, than of a return to the peace which regression

to the organic states promises.

Freud, at this point, began to treat the self-preservation

instincts as component instincts,

> "whose function is to assure that the organism
> shall follow its own path to death."
> (SE 17, p 39)

In this regard, then, death might be better understood not

as an instinct, but as an assurance, a reality. Death is a

part of the reality principle. The individual may carry an

unconscious, genetic knowledge of the reality of death, that

is, the individual's DNA programming "informs" him of the

absolute and ultimate limitation upon the duration of his

life. Dying, therefore, cannot be a process and is

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not a process, as living is a process. Even as one lies
dying, one is living. Neither can the individual ever
"know" death, as he knows life. Rather, the individual
knows of death. Just how does one know what death might
be? It is by the process and capacity for living, often
through our capacity to symbolically and actively self-sacri-
fice, consciously and unconsciously, to deliberately, if
unconsciously curtail the individual libido - Eros, Life.
This was precisely the phenomenon which led Freud to
postulate the death instinct: an irrepressable force which
is independent of the pleasure principle, and expressed
through masochism, ambivalence, repetition compulsion,
sadism, aggressiveness, and melancholia and their
clinical and pathological manifestations. At this point in
his theoretical formulations, were Freud to have posited an
altruistic instinct in conflict, in dynamic tension, with
the ego instincts, these latter clinical phenomena
might be more fully understood and explained in theory.
In fact, Freud, immediately after writing Beyond the Pleasure
Principle, considered just such an instinct in Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) and rejected it. A full
discussion of this will be in Chapter III.

Laplanche and Pontalis state that the two great classes
of instincts are postulated in this last theory of Freud's

less as the concrete motivational forces of the actual functioning of the organism, than as fundamental principles which ultimately regulate its activity. In this understanding Freud seems to be moving away from the idea of a "trieb" theory, and in the direction of instinct theory, as Laplanche and Pontalis define it, that is, as the organizing principle of behavior. Here principle is to be understood in the sense of being an actuating force or agency. In <u>An Outline of Psychoanalysis</u> (SE 23, p 148) Freud stated that the,

> "forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called instincts."

This shift of emphasis is especially clear in Freud's statement in <u>The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis</u>:

> "The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. (SE 23, p 95)

In summation of the Freudian instinctual theory, Laplanche and Pontalis state that it is founded upon the idea

> "that the sexual instinct exists to begin with in a polymorphous state ... initially indeterminate, the internal pressure faces vicissitudes that will stamp it with highly individualized traits ... Freud places all instinctual manifestations under the head of a single great basic antagonism ... derived from the mythical tradition: first between Hunger and Love, and later, between Love and Discord." (1970, p 420)

23.

It appears then that while Freud maintains a biological
basis for the instincts, the theory itself moves toward
an emphasis upon the "ideational representative" (of Lemaire,
1970), "the organizing principles," (of Bowlby, 1969), or,
in linguistic terms, the deep structure for patterns of
behavior, organization, symbolization, and interpretations.

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24.

BALINT:
Primary Love vs. Primary Narcissism

From Freud's instinct theory have developed several alternate
psychoanalytic lines of understanding human development and
psychopathology. After Freud and Melanie Klein it "became
possible to see the human psyche as an internal world of
internalized ego -object relationships which partly realistic-
ally and partly in highly distorted ways, reproduced the ego's
relationships to personal objects in the real, outer world."
(Guntrip, 1969, p 407) Klein's work itself, however, as will
be discussed later, is concerned with the internal object
relationships which for Klein have little to do with the
personal relationships of the infant with his family environ-
ment, and more to do, as with Freud's, with the individual,
fundamental, instinctual (sexual and aggressive-destructive)
tensions in the psyche. The actual mother-infant relationship
plays a minimal role in Klein's and Freud's theories: its
primary function is in mediating between, and thus, reducing
the primal instinctual tensions.

What Klein's work succeeded in doing, however, was to
replace primary naricssism with primary object seeking. By
attaching the object to the drive, object-seeking is inherent
in the organism. Eros, for her, actually phantasizes an
object, actually acknowledges that object, that other

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than self, immediately. This is in distinction to Freud, who postulated the infant as object-seeking but without a fundamental and immediate capacity for acknowledgement of the other. Greenberg and Mitchell, in Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory, explain this psychic mechanism by which the infant, in Kleinian theory, is primally capable of forming object relationships: "By projection, by turning outward libido and aggression and imbuing the object with them, the infant's first object relation comes about." (1983, p 58)

The fundamental questions in terms of object relationships are concerned with when in an individual's history does the infant cathect, that is, form a relationship with another, and what is the quality of that relationship. Freud's thinking on this topic as with his thinking on instinct, underwent a substantial change during the course of his writing. With the introduction of narcissism, that is, primary narcissism, object relatedness became that which followed the state of primary narcissism (1914). Although "On Narcissism" does not contain a concise description of primary narcissism, nevertheless, primary narcissism from thence became the standard theory used in describing the individual's most primal, and most primitive, that is, that which forms the most unconscious, non-verbal, most intensely experienced, relationship with the environment. Freud

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describes this primary naricssism in metaphor:

> 'Thus we form the idea of there being an
> original libidinal cathexis of the ego from
> which some is later given off to objects, but
> which fundamentally persists and is related
> to the object cathexis, much as the body of
> an amoeba is related to the pseudopoedia
> which it puts out." (SE 14, p 76)

My intention here is not so much to fully discuss primary narcissism per se, as it is to talk of object relatedness, and to understand it as fundamental, as emanating not from a narcissistic stage, but from its own primal source within the self, separate (if not totally independent) from a naricssistic cathexis.

Michael Balint, in his paper "Primary Narcissism and Primary Love" (1960) argues against the analytic literature of primary narcissism.

> "A close scrutiny of the available
> data suggests that the theory of primary
> narcissism, although compatible with,
> does not follow necessarily from these
> observations. A theory of primary love
> is proposed which seems to accord better
> with the observed facts. Using this theory
> a number of clinical observations can be
> better understood and integrated with each
> other to form a suggestive argument for its
> validity." (Balint, 1960, p 43)

In addition, Balint continues, Freud's theoretical construction of narcissism contains several inherent contradictions, none of which seems to be adequately addressed by later theorists, e.g., Hartmann and Kris. In finally reexamining the arguments

used by Freud and after him by the analytic literature,

> "to make the existence of primary narcissism
> acceptable, it is found that they prove only
> the existence of secondary narcissism,"
> (Balint, 1960, p 19)

that is, narcissism as an ego defense against environmental failure. Balint's argument that there are inherent contradictions in positing primary narcissism is simply that Freud also posits primary love and primary autoeroticism as well, without ever actually stating whether all three were not merely exclusive or that all three did not occur simultaneously. As for primary narcissism, Freud was at times locating it in the id and at other times in the ego. If primary narcissism originates from the id then the definition of primary narcissism as the ego cathecting itself would be inherently inconsistent. As cited by Balint, Freud states that, as late as 1938, 1940, in _An Outline of Psychoanalysis_,

> "It is difficult to say anything of the
> behavior of the libido in the id and in
> the superego. Everything we know about
> it relates to the ego, in which the whole
> available amount of libido is at first
> stored up. We call this state of things
> absolute primary narcissism." (SE 23, p 93)

In 1923, in _The Ego and The Id_, Freud says,

> "At the very beginning all the libido is
> accumulated in the id, while the ego is
> still in the process of formation or far
> from robust. Part of this libido is sent
> over by the id into erotic object cathexis,
> whereupon the ego, now growing stronger,
> attempts to obtain possession of this object

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> libido and to force itself upon the id
> as a love object. The narcissism of the
> ego is thus seen to be secondary, acquired
> by the withdrawal of the libido from
> objects." (SE 19, p 38)

Balint here asks, justifiably: "Is there any primary

narcissism in the ego?" (1960, p 13)

Balint discusses the explanations offered by Hartmann, Kris,

and Lowenstein, as to the location and development of primary

narcissism. Their arguments basically attempt to bridge

this contradiction in classical theory by positing two

defintions   ego - the topographical (id, ego, superego),

and the general (the self, the person), which they say, Freud

used interchangeably. Balint dismisses this explanation:

> "It is my belief that the internal
> contradictions in the theory of primary
> narcissism is not caused by careless usage
> or inability to see clearly and define
> exactly, but rather by Freud's unwilling-
> ness to give up or modify clinical obser-
> vations for the sake of a tidy theory.
> The reason he invariably returned to the
> cathexis of the ego by libido when he
> spoke of narcissism is simply that this is
> what can be observed." (Balint, 1960, p 17)

Balint holds that the narcissistic type of object choice,

which is a clinically observed fact, depends on secondary

and not on primary narcissism. This would place observable

narcissism in the realm of defense (occurring in response

to perceived intolerable environmental frustration) and out

of the realm of either the instinctual or primal. He offers

clinical data on schizoid regression to maintain his point.

> "Schizoid withdrawal is not proof of
> primary narcissism. Rather, it points
> to the hypersensitivity, to the desperate
> dependence on, and the very great need
> for harmony with, the environment and those
> people who are part of the environment."
> (Balint, 1960, p 27)

In other words, for Balint, a relationship with the environment, and those people within it, exists in a primal, primitive, and emerging state for the infant "right from the start and the infant may become aware of and respond to any considerable change in it." (1960, p 34) Balint calls this primary relationship with the environment "primary love."

According to the theory of primary narcissism the infant is born having little or no relationship with his environment. Balint's theory (as do the theories of the British school of object relationists) states that the individual is born in a state of intense relatedness to his environment, biologically and libidinally. This relatedness begins at birth, and is actually a form of adaptation required of the infant, under threat of death. For Balint, sadism, hate, destructive aggression are a secondary phenomena. This erases the life and death dualism of Freud and Klein. Destructive emotions result from inevitable frustrations. The aim of all human beings is to establish − or probably, reestablish − an all-embracing harmony with one's environment, to be able to love in peace.

One wonders at the implications of this monistic aim. At what point does the all embracing harmony, of which Balint speaks, stop? Is it with death, the ultimate carbonic harmony with the environment? Balint's theory of ultimate harmony parallels Freud's thinking in his positing the Nirvana principle. One might wonder if, with Balint, as with Freud, the ultimate aim of life is death. To avoid this flaw in metapsychology, one might posit some primal tension (as Freud recognized the necessity of doing) in order that the aim of life might be, as anyone might intuitively understand it to be, the maintenance of some dynamic equilibrium within life, so that human beings are not existentially pitted between the equally desirous alternatives of life and death. If that tension is not between life and death, might it not, as will be discussed later, be the tension between altruism and egoism, the instinctual tension between the pro-social and egoistic instincts?

BOWLBY:

Attachment: Instinct Reinterpreted

John Bowlby's theoretical formulations include the concept

of instinct, but draw upon a new paradigm, different from

Freud's. His model, like Freud's drive theory, draws from

other disciplines and like Freud's, reflects the scientific

thinking of the times. For Bowlby, the models from ethology

and general systems theory have contributed to his understand-

ing of human instinct theory. Freud's instinct theory, the

pleasure principle, and the traditional theory of defense

are examples of formulations which, because they are cast

in terms of a psychical energy model (a closed system theory),

are unsatisfactory as they stand in our present understanding

of the world and how it works.

Bowlby argues against the psychical energy model [2.] on

the basis of observable data. Freud's psychical energy

model which is not observable, but rather, according to Freud,

"a science erected on empirical interpretation," (Freud, SE 14,

p 77) wherein motivation results from an accumulation of

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2. "I'm altogether doubtful whether any decisive pointers for the
differentiation and classification of the instincts can be arrived
at on the basis of working over the psychological material. This
working over seems rather itself to call for the application to
the material of different assumptions concerning instinctual life,
and it would be a desirable thing if these assumptions could be
taken from some other branch of knowledge and carried over to
psychology." (Freud, SE 14, p 15) Thus we have Freud acknowledging
the need for a well developed, scientifically based instinctual
theory.

psychical energy and cessation from exhaustion, does not fully explain certain observed behaviors, e.g., an infant's crying for mother, ceasing to cry with the presence of mother, and resumption with mother leaving. The change in behavior, Bowlby argues, seems readily understood as due to signals arising from changes in the environment. If these changes in the environment affect the level of psychical energy, then a change in psychical energy as a cause is secondary.

In place of psychical energy and its discharge, Bowlby's central concepts are those of behavioral systems and their control of information, negative feedback, and a behavioral form of homeostasis. Bowlby has no conflict in integrating this new idea of instincts with those ideas central to psycho-analysis: (1.) the role of unconscious mental processes, including instinctual tensions and conflicts leading to a dynamic repression as a process of maintaining unconscious material; (2.) transference as a main determinant of behavior; and (3.) the origin of neurosis in childhood trauma. Biology, Bowlby says, no longer assumes the principle of entropy (which led Freud to formulate the concepts of psychical homeostasis and tendency toward regression to the inorganic, that is, the death instinct) necessarily applies to living, as it does to non-living organisms. Theory today is concerned with the concepts of organization and information, and of the living organism as an open, not a closed system.

Within the psychoanalytic movement itself, Bowlby has

been most influenced by those theories since Freud that

concentrated on the observable data of an individual's

compelling tendency to seek relationships with other persons

and to regard this tendency as representing a primary prin-

ciple and therefore either of equal importance in psychical

life to the pleasure and Nirvana principle, or as an alter-

native to them. However, Bowlby states, the absense of any

instinctual theory among the object relationship theorists is

the major shortcoming of their theory.

Bowlby, in Volume I of <u>Attachment and Loss</u>, sets down

four main characteristics of instinctual behavior according

to his model which draws from ethology, experimental psychol-

ogy, and neurophysiology:

> "a. it follows a recognizably similar and predictable
> pattern in almost all members of a species (or all
> members of one sex);
> b. it is not a simple response to a single stimulus
> but a sequence of behaviour that usually runs a
> predictable course;
> 3. certain of its usual consequences are of obvious
> value in contributing to the preservation of an
> individual or the continuity of the species;
> d. many examples of it develop even when all the
> ordinary opportunities for learning it are exiguous
> or absent." (Bowlby, 1969, 1982, p 38)

This concept of instinct reduces the argument of "innate

vs. acquired" to the absurd.

> "Every biological character, whether it be
> morphological, physiological, or behavioural,
> is a product of the interaction of genetic
> endowment with the environment ... The early

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> "form (instinctual) is not superceded: it is
> modified, elaborated, and augmented but it
> still determines the overall pattern."
> (Bowlby, 1960, p 40)

Instinctual behaviour is not inherited:

> "what is inherited is a potential to develop
> certain sorts of systems, termed behavioural
> systems, both the nature and form of which
> differ in some measure according to the par-
> ticular environment in which development
> takes place."   (Bowlby, 1960, p 45)

Bowlby coins the phrase "environment of adaptedness",
to explain that particular sort of environment to which the
system, whether man-made or biological, or both, is adapted.
Only within its environment of adaptedness can it be expected
that a system will work efficiently, says Bowlby. What
comprises man's environment of evolutionary adaptedness?
Bowlby's answer is that environment to the degree which
would have contributed to population survival in man's
primeval environment.

Of equal importance as the human species adaptive capacity
for human survival, is that which has remained relatively
unchanged since primeval days. For Bowlby that which has
remained relatively unchanged over time is the mother-infant
dyad.

> "Whether the larger group is stable or not,
> the tie between a mother and her children is
> always present and virtually unchanging."
> (Bowlby, 1960, p 61)

What Bowlby is saying here is that his understanding of evolutionary theory considers equally important both the human capacity for adaptation and the limitations or boundaries of human adaptation.

Behavior, according to Bowlby, is oriented by internal maps, or "plan hierarchy" within which substructures of any number and kind are integrated and goal corrected. The way in which instinctive behavior is initiated and the way in which it is organized are in fact closely interconnected. In other words, causal factors are the results of interplay of environmental and organismic systems. For Bowlby, as with general systems theory, causal explanations are tautologies. Human plans contain working, that is, dynamic models of both the environment and the organism. And Bowlby continues:

> "The environmental and organismic models described here as necessary parts of a sophisticated biological control system are, of course, none other than the 'internal worlds' of traditional psychoanalytic theory seen in a new perspective. As in the traditional theory, so in the theory advanced, much psychopathology is regarded as being due to models that are in greater or less degree inadequate or inaccurate." (Bowlby, 1960, p 82)

Apparently, for Bowlby, this instinctual capacity for such a highly organized internal schema is largely unconscious. Bowlby asserts that, for the most part, in order for revision and change to occur, it must be done consciously, that is to say, that conscious experience is actually a metaorganizing

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experience. The unity of consciousness would, on this basis, reflect the integration of the metaorganizing experience, according to Bowlby.

Bowlby discusses altruism employing a biological approach to this concept as well. He combines his ideas of the human evolutionary process with a semiotic (systems) approach:

> "Behaviour that has an altruistic function
> is perhaps understood a little more readily
> than is behaviour the function of which
> appears more egoistic ... Once the criterion
> in terms of which a system's function is to
> be considered is recognized to be the survi-
> val of the genes carried by the individual
> concerned, the fact that much behaviour has
> an altruistic function is no surprise. In
> addition, there is a genetic theory of natural
> selection based on the principle of reciprocal
> altruism. Provided that help given to a friend is
> occasionally reciprocated, a tendency to behave
> altruistically will be favoured by natural
> selection. Conscious calculation is not
> required, though in man, of course, it may occur
> ...This means that altruistic behaviour springs
> from roots just as deep as does egoistic, and that
> the distinction between the two, though real,
> is far from fundamental." (Bowlby, 1960, p 133)

In other words, Bowlby is clearly saying that considering altruistic and egoistic behavior, one cannot be instinctual while the other is learned, as classical psychoanalytic theory asserts.

It becomes apparent, as one reads Bowlby, that his thinking seems to be somewhat more consistent with Freud's

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earlier theory.

> "Current theory, in keeping with many of
> Freud's earlier ideas, conceives the organism
> as starting with or developing a large but
> finite number of structured behavioural systems
> (some of which are potentially active at birth
> and some of which become so later) which in
> the course of development become so elaborately
> through processes of learning and integration,
> and in man, by imitation and the use of symbols,
> that the resulting behaviour is of amazing
> varieties and plasticity." (Bowlby, 1960, p 173)

Where Bowlby differs from Freud is in the notion of psychical

energy which Bowlby asserts is not needed for an understanding

of complex human behavior. Bowlby states that variations

in the intensity of a particular behavior are attributed to

variations in the activating conditions and to the develop-

mental state of behavioral systems so activated, but not

to a raised pressure of psychical energy.

Bowlby's main contribution to the psychoanalytic liter-

ature is his concept of attachment built on the theory of

instinctual behavior. It postulates that the child's tie

to his mother is a product of the activity of a number of

behavioral systems. Attachment behavior is held to have

a biological link little considered. In his formulation,

there is no reference to "needs" or "drives". Instead

attachment behavior is regarded as that which occurs when

certain behavioral systems are activated, and resulting

from specific interactions of the infant with his environ-

ment, the mediator, so to speak, the mother.

By what criteria does one judge the beginning attachment
behavior in humans? Observation places initiation with the
mother and not the child. And, the pattern of interaction
that gradually develops between mother and infant can be
understood only as a result of the contribution of each and
especially, of the way in which each in turn influence the
behavior of the other. For Bowlby, by the time attachment
behavior is observed in humans, it has undergone such vicissi-
tudes that explanation employing primary cause as extreme
dependency of the child for the mother is gravely inadequate.

Regarding attachment and its perceived importance Bowlby
writes that,

> "no form of behaviour is accompanied by stronger
> feeling than is attachment behaviour. The figures
> toward whom it is directed are loved and their
> advent is greeted with joy. So long as a child
> is in the unchallenged presence of a principal
> attachment figure, or within easy reach, he
> feels secure. A threat of loss creates anxiety,
> and actual loss, sorrow; both, moreover, are
> likely to arouse anger." (Bowlby, 1960, p 209)

Of importance is the distinction between attachment as an
organizing principle and attachment behavior, per se. Need-
less to say, a child's attachment behavior is controlled
by a behavioral system conceived as an organization existing
within the child. In its postulating the existence of this
internal organization of symbolic representations of all
the past significant interactions with attachment figures,

Bowlby's theory is clearly differentiated from behaviorism and can be utilized by those proponents of structural theory, namely, psychoanalysis, Piagetian theory, critical analysis. How such a model can be used by psychoanalysis will be discussed more fully with the discussion of Michael Friedman's work and the Control Mastery theory in later chapters.

Also of importance in Bowlby's writing is the clarification of the distinction between attachment behavior and all other behavior the aim of which is seeking and maintaining proximity to another individual. Of prime importance in understanding attachment organization is in understanding it as a safety regulating system, namely, according to Bowlby, a system the activities of which tend to reduce the risk of the individual coming to harm and are experienced as causing anxiety to be allayed and a sense of security to be increased. (1960, p 374) Interestingly, here, Bowlby does not stipulate for whom the activity is initiated. One might assume he is speaking for the one who initiates the behavior, except that at other times, he clearly states, as with the mother-infant relationship, the one who initiates safety regulating behavior is not necessarily the prime sensor of discomfort and danger. In other words the mother responds to the child in anticipation of the child perceiving danger and distress. This maternal capacity, as the object relationships will

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demonstrate, is absolutely crucial for the psychological

health of the infant. Bowlby insists, however, that it is

precisely this point of either acknowledging a biological

function to attachment behavior and organization, or

regarding it as an infantile characteristic and therefore

regressive behavior in adults, as do the drive theorists,

which determines one's whole approach to human understanding.

> "When the attachment to a preferred person of an
> infant, a child, or an adult is viewed in the way
> proposed, the ensuing behaviour is likely to be
> respected as being as intrinsic to human nature
> as are, say, sexual behaviour or eating behaviour.
> (Bowlby, 1960, p 375)

Bowlby, in describing a mother-infant relationship, refers

to it as attachment/caregiving behavior to distinguish the

complementary roles of each. It is his belief that the

reversal of roles between parent and child, unless of a tempo-

rary nature, is almost always a sign of pathology in the

parent and a cause of it in the child. This situation is

undeniably undesirable and pathology inducing. However,

Bowlby's own observations of healthy mother-infant interaction

suggest a far more complex and multi-dimensional and

bi-directional relationship between the two. What Searles

says on this particular point is that the mother must be

able to continuously receive the "gifts" of love and attach-

ment from the child in order to reciprocate with the care-

giving the child needs and desires.

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Bowlby's theory here runs the risk of creating exactly what
he intends to clarify, namely not mistaking the behavior for
the organizing schema. By so doing the dynamic tension of
each and between the two roles — the tension of ego demands
vs. altruistic desires — is reduced to some homeostatic
maintenance of some ideal state of being. By stressing the
complementarity of the behaviors, Bowlby runs the risk of
assuming that their foundations lie in different instinctual
organizing patterns, e.g., one is purely or simply egoistic,
while the other is simply altruistic. This would be counter
to Bowlby's basic argument, it would seem. It would be
more accurate, then, to consider the mutuality of roles as
a dynamic mutuality with each participant capable of
giving and receiving in a mutually compatible and healthy way
and stemming from instinctual motivations blended to meet the
complexities of the situation and the behavior. This attempt
to understand the motivational complexities of the mother and
infant in no way limits the obvious reality, however, of the
infant's dependence upon the caregiving of the mother.

What Bowlby's writing and theory clearly convey is a
respect for the life-long process of human attachment
behavior and its derivatives based upon instinctual patterns
of organization of that behavior and understanding. Bowlby's
theory stands in direct contrast to Freud's which emphasizes
the ever increasing detachment from parents as the course

of childhood development. Bowlby would consider that a
certain type of separation from the primary attachment figure
is undeniably a universal phenomenon of healthy growth,
but to say as did Freud in <u>Civilization and its Discontents</u>
that detachment is a task facing every individual leading to
"difficulties which are inherent in all psychical develop-
ment," (SE 21, p 103) is seemingly mistaking the change
of aim and object for a change of the behavior. For Bowlby
one changes the choice of object of attachment behavior and
organization, but does not discard the organization itself.
Bowlby's explanation is understandable within the theoretical
formulation that the self is constituted out of the relation-
ship with the other, so that the phenomenological dynamic
is not between attachment and detachment, but between self
and other. Following chapters will develop more fully th
concept of a fundamental dynamic between the self and other,
and that this dynamic is founded upon an instinctual interplay
between the motivational factors of egoism and altruism.

THE BRITISH SCHOOL:
Object Relations Theory

Greenberg and Mitchell in <u>Object Relations Theory in</u>
<u>Psychoanalytic Theory</u> (1983) attempt to redefine Freud's
theoretical model utilizing a hermeneutic approach in their
presentation.

> "There must be a link between Freud's language
> of force, counterforce, and energy transmuted
> into structure and his vision of human exper-
> ience - between the 'how' and the 'why'. No
> observor of human behavior can fail to notice
> that people act on the basis of the meaning
> which they attribute to their experience of
> themselves and of the world around them."
> (1983, p 23)

Thus, they say, any theory must contain a theory of meaning.
And so must Freud's drive (trieb) theory. The drives are
not only the mechanisms of the mind, they are also its contents.
"The activity of the drives gives rise to the whole variega-
tion of the phenomena of life," said Freud. (SE 23, p 148)

Object relationship theory leans heavily thoward the theory
of meaning in the context of how individual theory creates
personality and psychopathology. This body of work stands
with Bowlby's as an important contribution and complement
to the psychoanlytic drive-structure model. The drive-structure
model posits an internal psychic tension between sets of
incompatible ideas, resulting in psychic conflict which
creates the phenomenon of repression. In Freudian theory,
repression is central. However, as with much of Freud's
ideas, repression underwent change regarding

the force behind the phenomenon. In 1895, in "Studies in

Hysteria", Freud said that

> "the basis for repression itself can only be a
> feeling of unpleasure, the incompatibility
> between the single idea that is to be re-
> pressed and the dominant mass of ideas
> constituting the ego." (SE 3, p 116)

In 1914, Freud later said that repression

> "proceeds from the self-respect of the ego."
> (SE 14, p 93)

What is apparent regarding Freud's ideas of repression is,

according to Greenberg and Mitchell, that the the incompatible

ideas are incompatible within a given context, a particular

social situation, and the idea of pleasure in Freud's early

version became pleasure in the symbolic rather than the

physical or sensate. The pleasure of self-respect (1914)

is clearly the pleasure of self-reflection and not the pleasure

of the immediate. This concept of the self-reflective being as

an agent of repression raises important questions: does

repression not occur before the capacity for self reflection

is fully developed; or, do self reflection and repression

occur simultaneously; and, how does the infant reflect upon

himself and his environment. One could arguably state that

although the capacity for self reflection is not fully devel-

oped in the infant its structural foundations are intrinsi-

cally established in the human infant.

As will be shown, the fundamental tension of repression is
discarded by the object relationists. In its place is
substituted what might be considered "lack" or undevelop-
ment leading to a search for a return to a utopian state of
non-tension. The question then arises as to whether this
"lack" or undevelopment can explain the phenomena of repres-
sion and the unconscious. This fact, albeit important fact,
that as a theory object relations loses sight of this
fundamental tension should not deter one from acknowledging
and employing the contributions of the object relationists
to the analytic literature. Of particular concern in this
paper are concepts of relationship, relatedness, and attach-
ment, and how they are understood in themselves and in
relation to the concepts of instincts, empathy, egoism,
and altruism.

For Freud, object relationships derived from a sense of
narcissistic losses and early danger. Although valued and
important in explaining psychological development, these
concepts are always subordinate to instinctual determin-
ants. Interestingly, Greenberg and Mitchell in discussing
the pre-oedipal period and the child's relationship to his
environment, do not consider the child's behavior as instinct-
ually based or regulated.

> "What is clearest is the child's vulnerability, his
> need for other people. His instinctual aims are
> difficult to discern; they are fragmented, inchaote.
> We focus, then less on those aims than on the child's
> vulnerability and security needs and these force on
> our attention an awareness of the exquisite interaction
> between the child and his caretakers."
> (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p 75)

It is as if the child's vulnerability and security needs
were not in themselves instinctually based. And, are the
instinctual aims fragmented or rather, are they not, though
definitely undeveloped both symbolically and socially, at
this early stage actually united, fused? The work of Michael
Friedman and Martin Hoffman, it is hoped, will elaborate
upon and integrate this position into the main body of
psychoanalytic understanding and theory.

47.

MELANIE KLEIN:
Instinct Joined to Object Relations

Melanie Klein's work stresses the importance of one's
mental processes and internal object relationships. This
position stems from her understanding of the role of phantasy
in the early life of the infant. For Klein, phantasy is
constructed from the resevoir of unconscious images and
knowledge which is the individual's phylogenetic inheritance.
The individual infant, over the first year, establishes a
complex set of internalized object relationships and the
phantasies and anxieties concerning the state of one's inter-
nal object world which includes the self, the other, and the
relationship(s) between the two. These phantasies are the
underlying basis for one's behavior, moods and sense of self.
Klein postulates two kinds of anxiety, both resulting from
one's phantasies: that of paranoid anxiety - resulting
from the knowledge of a fear of the self and possibly of the
treasured other being destroyed by the imagined other, or
non-self; and that of depressive anxiety - resulting from
the knowledge and fear of the fate of others, both internal
and external, in the face of the phantasied destruction
created by the child's own aggression. It is the later
anxiety - the depressive anxiety - which both forces and
allows the child to attempt to resolve his depressive anxiety,
and the intense guilt that accompanies it, through

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"reparation" - reparative phantasies and behavior. The child does this through employing a phantasied omnipotence in the service of love and reparation. It is very clear to Klein that the child's concern for others and his subsequent reparative phantasies do not consist simply of a defense against his destructiveness, nor is it only anxiety deriving from dependence on the object, both real and internal. This concern is an expression of genuine love and regret. The depressive anxiety and guilt actually begins with the earliest relationship the infant has to the breast, but they do not develop fully until the child "understands", or, for Klein, "introjects" whole objects. Klein believes that depressive anxiety is never fully overcome:

> "the fate of one's objects in the face of one's own conflictual feelings remains a central concern throughout life ... The child regrets the damage he feels he has inflicted upon his parents. He attempts to repair that damage, to make good, over and over again." (Klein, 1948, p 34)

Unlike later theorists, who either abandon or reinterpret the concept of drive, Klein seemingly extends and elaborates classical drive theory, particularly with regard to the role of the object. In Freud's theory, the object remains secondary and always functionally subordinate to the aim of drive satisfaction. In Klein's writings, the object is more basic and essential; drives are inherently and inseparably directed towards objects.

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Klein postulates that the content and nature of relations with objects, both real other people and phantasied images of others imagined as internal presences, are the crucial determinant of most important psychical processes, both normal and pathological. She argued that Freud's narcissistic libido reflects not a cathexis of the ego itself but of internal objects and thus replaced Freud's distinction between narcissistic libido and object libido with the distinction between relations with internal vs. external objects. For Klein, then, the drives themselves are oriented toward others, toward the real others while at the same time containing phylogenetic phantasied information of the other. In Envy and Gratitude, she writes:

> "My contribution (is) that the infant has from the beginning of post-natal life a relation to the mother ... which is imbued with the fundamental elements of an object relation, that is, love, hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defenses." (Klein, 1952, p 49)

She continues:

> "There is no instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external or internal; in other words, object relations are at the centre of emotional life." (1952, p 53)

Caring, for Klein, the caring of the child for the parent is not motivated merely by the child's dependence on his objects for drive gratification, but involves a "profound urge to make sacrifices" to make others happy, out of genuine

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sympathy for them. Psychic conflict is maintained in Kleinian theory. Unlike Freud's theory, it is not so much the conflict between objectless life and death instincts, but between love and hate, between the caring preservation and the envious destruction of others. Thus, love and hate are object related by nature.

There are some fundamental criticisms of Klein which for the purposes of this paper are worth mentioning. For Klein, real object and real relationships are central. However, this relationship is, according to Greenberg and Mitchell, tightly circumscribed and unidimensional. In other words, these object relationships and objects are important as representatives of universal attributes - a mother with breasts, a father with penis. The impact of the real parents as real others relating to the real infant is discussed only in so far as they can be constructed by the infant as good objects mediating the aggression toward the internally created, phantasied, bad objects. The particular parents and particular relationships of the infant with the parents do not seem to contribute to the establishment of bad objects introjected by the infant. The real relationship and the parent's own conflicts, both external and internal, do not contribute to the infant's own anxiety and guilt. For Klein, the infant is both

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exquisitely sensitive and completely oblivious to the
mother, the parents, the environment. Critics argue
with Klein for her placing the development of such
intricate and sophisticated feelings as envy, gratitude,
and guilt at such an early age - the second half of the
first year. Arguably, this is a point well taken. Guilt,
as we understand it, that is, moral culpability, surely
cannot be known to the infant as it is known to the adult.
What is a major contribution from the writings of Melanie
Klein is her understanding of the infant's very early
capacity for anxiety within the context of this relation-
ship, as well as the infant's capacity for omnipotent
culpability in these early intensely personal relationships.
From these early empathic relationships characterized by
omnipotent culpability, one finds the deep structure for
the more highly refined system of moral guilt which is the
foundation for human interaction, for human society. This
idea will be more fully developed in later chapters.

FAIRBAIRN:
Dependence vs. Libido

Fairbairn's theory is founded upon two basic principles:
libido is not pleasure seeking but object seeking; and,
impulse is inseparable from structure. These two basic
principles differentiate Fairbairn's theory from drive
theory. How, in fact, does this distinction between an
object seeking libido and a pleasure seeking libido affect
one's theoretical model? Fairbairn took as his model,
Melanie Klein's concept of internal objects, and rejected
Freud's instinct theory completely. He substituted for it
object relationships - the object and not gratification is
the ultimate aim of libidinal striving. For Fairbairn,
the Ego in Personal Relationships is the key psychodynamic
concept, with an emphasis on the development of basic ego
relatedness in the baby, in the primary mother - infant
relationship.

Fairbairn seems to posit a primary, unitary, dynamic Ego
complete with defenses for coping with the inevitable unsat-
isfying object. What Fairbairn's theory is, according to
Greenberg and Mitchell, is a fundamentally different view of
human motivation, meaning, and values.

> "It is not the libidinal attitude which
> determines the object relationship, but
> the object relationship which determines
> the libidinal attitude."
> (Fairbairn, 1941, p 34)

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He posits a relationship seeking human infant from the very

beginning and says that this relationship seeking has

adaptive roots in biological survival. The apparent

chaos and random behavior of the infant reflects inexperi-

ence, he says, and not primary narcissistic, or autoerotic

tendencies and behavior. Without built-in patterns, Fairbairn

reasoned, it takes the human infant time to learn how to

make contact and organize his relationship with his mother.

Fairbarin's theory is distinct from Klein's in a most

essential way: he places great emphasis on the external

reality of the relationship of mother and infant, and infant

and others. It is the real object (external) which is the

foundation for the object relationship, and it is this object

relationship which may be the cause of psychopathology.

Fairbairn sees development as beginning with a stage of

infantile dependence with the mouth and the maternal breast,

as complimentary libidinal organ and object. Development

proceeds toward mature dependence wherein ego and object

are fully differentiated and the individual is capable of

valuing the object for its own sake. Pure pleasure seeking

behavior with no regard for relations with particular objects

does not reflect a baseline in human motivation, according

to Fairbairn. Rather, it is reflective of a deterioration

of natural, object-related libidinal functioning.

Aggression, for Fairbairn, unlike for Klein, is not natural and is not a drive. It exists as potential and is activated through the frustration experienced by the infant of the failure of objects to satisfy his needs. Fairbairn's hypothesis is that it is the failure of the environment, that is, civilization in general which causes pathology. It is because of the widespread disruptive impact of civilization on the natural development of the mother-infant dyad, that intense aggression is a crucial factor with which the ego must grapple in its struggle to maintain good object relations.

What Fairbairn has constructed is a unitary ego, more closely resembling the concept of "self" in psychoanalytic literature, which relates initially to part and split objects. These split objects are satisfying or unsatisfying objects. Both part objects are desired by the infant. In fact, Fairbairn said, it is precisely because an unsatisfying object is desired, as well as because it is felt to be bad, that an object is internalized. Internalization is more a matter of coercion than it is of wish-fulfillment. What the whole ego is striving for, is seeking, is to reach an object where it may find support. Psychopathology occurs around striving for contact by the dependent child. Fairbairn believed that the child attempts to protect what is gratifying in the relationship with the parent by establishing compensatory internal object relations. It is in the obstinate attachment

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of the libidinal ego to the exciting ego that the child

preserves the hopes for fuller more satisfying contact

with the parent. The emptier the real exchange, the greater

will be his devotion to the promising, yet depriving features

of his parents, which he has internalized and seeks gratifi-

cation from within. In addition, he preserves his child-

hood terror that if he disengages himself from these internal

objects, he will find himself totally alone. It is both

the experience of these internal object relations and the

subsequent chronic projection of them onto the outside world

which produces pathological suffering within the human exper-

ience.

Psychopathology persists, destructive patterns of integrating

relations with others and of experiencing life are perpetuated

because, beneath the pain and the self-defeating relations

organization of experience, lie ancient internal attachments

and allegiences to early significant others. The recreation

of sorrow, suffering, and defeat are forms of renewal and

devotion to these ties. Health and change and fulfillment of

desire are equivalent to betrayal of these intense, early

attachments. Fairbairn gives as an example of this perpetu-

ation of suffering, that of the delinquent child:

> "If the delinquent child is reluctant to
> admit that his parents are bad objects, he
> by no means displays equal reluctance to
> admit that he himself is bad. It becomes
> obvious, therefore, that the child would

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"rather be bad himself than have bad objects;
and accordingly we have some justification
for surmising that one of his motives in be-
coming bad is to make his objects good. In
becoming bad he is really taking upon himself
the burden of badness which appears to reside
in his objects. By this means he seeks to
purge them of their badness; and, in propor-
tion as he succeeds in doing so, he is rewarded
by that sense of security which an environment
of good objects so characteristically confers
...Outer security is thus purchased at the price
of inner security: and his ego is henceforth
left at the mercy of (internal) persecutors."
(Fairbairn, in Buckley, 1986, p 109)

Ego and object are inseparable for Fairbairn. The ego

is inconceivable except as inherently connected to objects.

An objectless ego, for Faribairn, is a contradiction in

terms. Central to almost all of his formulations is an

emphasis on the child's total dependency on significant

others. Early disturbances around dependency form the basis

for all emotional events throughout life. All relationships

are valued according to their capacity for gratifying

dependency needs, he said. In so doing, Fairbairn was unable

to acknowledge the basic empathic strivings and capacity of

the human infant in the primal relationship. In stressing

the pristine integrity of the original Ego, and placing

blame for all difficulties in living on parental psycho-

pathology, and environmental suffering, Fairbairn overlooks

such important issues as the distortions and misunderstandings

of early experience resulting from immature, and inadequate

perceptual and cognitive capacities of the infant.

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Interestingly, Fairbairn's pristine Ego must, therefore, be a passive ego. Such a conceptualization leads one into a fatalistic perspective. Adult psychotherapy becomes a therapy of compensation and acceptance, rather than of active change by an active participant who had somehow actually participated in the original psychopathological perceptions and beliefs.

The significance, nonetheless, of Fairbairn's theory to this present work, is that Fairbairn's psychology reflects an understanding of the human child as essentially a social child. In other words, the child is not socialized: it does not learn to love objects through a primary narcissistic lens, seeking objects in counterbalance to its longing for Nirvana, for death; nor is it primarily concerned with primary phantasies of love and hate. Rather, the child is born with an innate drive toward relatedness with real people in a real world. Disturbances in the real relationship may create defenses of aggression and hate. Hate, then, is a distortion of love, not a primary opposing force to love. Death is a fact of life, and not its primary opposing force.

WINNICOTT:
The Mother-Infant Matrix

"When I look I am seen, so I exist." (Winnicott, 1972, p 134) Donald Winnicott's statement encapsulating the essence of relatedness, forms the central theme of his theory. His writings, according to Greenberg and Mitchell, disclose one central thematic interest: the delicate and intricate dialectic between contact and differentiation. Almost all of his writings center around this analysis of the human struggle to be that of the individual existence of the self which allows for intimate contact with others. In contrast to Fairbairn's "pristine whole Ego at birth," Winnicott claims that the baby is a whole human being at birth. The self, at this very early stage, is only potential. Self development begins (for the infant) in a state of "unintegration". The infant's organization of himself, of his experience, is preceded by, and draws upon, the mother's organization and perceptions of him. The infant is not born into an awareness of or capacity for object relationships. Rather, he changes from being merged with the mother to being separate from her, or relating to her as separate from himself, as "not me". There is no such thing as an infant, Winnicott insists, only a nursing couple - the mother-infant unit.

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The process of differentiation does not take place in
the child, but in the relational field between the child
and mother (caretaker).

>"The centre of gravity of the being does
>not start off in the individual. It is in
>the total set up."(Winnicott, 1952, p 99)

This relational field within which the infant is contained
and experienced, he calls the "holding environment." The
mother's absorption in fantasies and experiences with her
infant is a natural, biologically based, and adaptive
feature of human behavior. This experience of the holding
environment and its particular features is crucial to
development. A healthy, creative self development is
contingent upon certain environmental provisions which
Winnicott calls "good enough mothering".

>"Individuals live creatively and feel that
>life is worth living or else... they cannot
>live creatively and are doubtful about the
>value of living. This variable in human
>beings is directly related to the quality
>and quantity of environmental provision
>at the beginning, or in the early phases
>of each baby's living experience."
>(1971, p 83)

Total dependence at the beginning of an individual's life
creates a total vulnerability to the nonresponsiveness and
intrusions of the environment (mother or caretaker). The
infant experiences these intrusions and nonresponses as
annihilations of personal continuity, as annihilations of
the self. The inevitable result of this vulnerability

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is that there develops within the individual, in fact, created by the individual out of this lack, a private and subjective reality held forever inaccessible to public, objective light. However, even this most private self is constituted, can only be constituted, out of the relationship with the other, according to Winnicott.

Deficiencies in maternal care, suggests Winnicott, which would be any failure to provide a perfect environment have a degenerative impact upon the emotional development of the child. Maternal deficiencies are experienced by the child as a terrifying "impingement" on his own personal existence: something from the outside is making claims on him, demanding a response from him at a time (both existentially and developmentally) when "being" is far more essential than "responding".

According to Greenberg and Mitchell's commentary on Winnicott's theory:

> the infant "is wrenched from his quiescent
> state and forced to respond, or he is com-
> pelled to abandon his own wishes, to accept
> prematurely the feeble and unrealistic
> nature of his demands, and to mold himself
> to what is provided for him ...Out of neces-
> sity he becomes prematurely and compulsively
> attuned to the claims and requests of others
> ...He loses touch with his own spontaneous
> needs and gestures, as these bear no relation
> to the way his mother experiences him and
> what she offers him." (1983, p 194)

Winnicott does not elaborate upon these spontaneous needs of the infant but one assumes that they too must be,

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at least in part, socially generated since the self is only potential at birth, created out of the essentially social nursing unit.

What results from these inevitable intrusions of the environment upon the developing self is a defensive self-fragmentation between the true and the false self. The false self provides an illusion of personal existence and protects the integrity of the true self. The false self draws upon the cognitive functions of the individual in its anticipations of and reactions to environmental impingements, resulting in an overactivity of mind and a separation of cognitive processes from any affective or somatic grounding.

Winnicott poses, as does Fairbairn, dependence as the cause for the child's defensive abandonment of his own spontaneous needs, images, and gestures. Whereas, Fairbairn sees internalized objects as arising out of a compensatory nature, that is, taking the place of aspects of the real object and the real relationship, Winnicott sees defense (the true and false self) arising out of consequences of the child's dual capacity and need to both engage the parents and to protect the real self from being overwhelmed or exploited. Winnicott's conceptualization of defense apparently avoids the morally reprehensible and experientially unreal position which Fair-

bairn's theory leaves to the psychoanalytic literature:
connectedness and a sense of individual empathy, loyalty,
and guilt are always defensive in nature; they are
defenses against the reality of a non-totally gratifying
environment that the infinitely greedy infant demands and
expects.

   One could not argue against the apparent defenselessness
of the infant and his primal motivation as being one of
preservation of the mother - infant relationship, the
source of. life for him, to insure his own survival. What
Winnicott does not address is just when the child is able
to choose this sort of defense. How does he explain the
child's predisposition to "sensitively intuit" what the
mother requires from the child in the relationship. Nor
does he explain why, as dependency subsides, would the child
continue to "sacrifice" his own spontaneous needs for
those perceived as the mother's? Without acknowledging
some sense of empathic altruism, and sense of loyalty as
a moral imperative stemming from the child's capacity for
guilt (arising out of, what Fairbairn calls, omnipotent
culpability), psychoanlaytic technique following Winni-
cott's theory runs the risk of becoming something akin to
a regiment of behavior modification. The later chapters
will explicate   a theory of psychotherapy founded upon

63.

an elaboration of Winnicott's premise of the dynamic
tension within the individual psyche between contact
and differentiation.

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64.

GUNTRIP:
Instinctual Regression

Harry Guntrip, the disciple of both Fairbairn and
Winnicott, further elaborates upon their theories of the
infant in relation to his environment. Whereas Fairbairn
describes the infant as a whole Ego and Winnicott says it is a
whole human being, Guntrip says the infant is a whole psyche
with human ego potential at birth. It depends on the quality
of the mother's relating as to whether this potential is
evoked and grows a real Ego or Personal Self. If not, the
True Self is not so much put back into a sort of cold storage
as Winnicott says, but rather, is left unevoked by lack of
any relationship in which it could grow. Defense, then,
is failure to grow, according to Guntrip. He makes a marked
departure from Fairbairn and Winnicott in his understanding
of psychopathlogy. The regressive experience is one of
objectlessness. Guntrip's premise is that the dynamic pull
within the human experience is between object relatedness and
a total retreat from others, both real and imagined, accom-
panied by a deep longing for a return to the womb.
Regressive flight is a reaction to conflict and deprivation.
In this state, he says, object loss is equivalent to ego loss.
When the ego is lost there is no longer any point in going
on living. Yet, it is not clear what this flight to

objectlessness is. Conflict is basically a lost psychic

reality. The human being, he says,

> "develops conflicting and incompatible
> reactions to his own needs and to the
> people and situations he. meets. This is
> what we mean broadly by ego-splitting, and
> we need a terminology to express this
> inner disunity,not as instinct terminology
> but one that clarifies the strongly per-
> sisting differences of attitudes and
> reaction within the overall ego, which
> prevent it from presenting a united front
> to life and undermine self-confidence."
> (Guntrip, 1971, p 170)

Greenberg and Mitchell understand the differences between

Fairbairn and Guntrip as follows:

> "In Fairbairn's system object-seeking, the
> need for contact and relation, is primary;
> for Guntrip, withdrawal is primary, and
> object seeking is a secondary defensive
> reaction against the terror of regressive
> longing. For Guntrip, the regressed ego
> abandons objects while for Fairbairn, the
> ego can never rid itself of objects."
> (1984, p 115)

Whether one perceives Guntrip's object seeking, as in this

explanation, as defensive, or as stated earlier, as in a

dynamic tension with the desire to withdraw, object seeking

always carries with it the propensity to internalize bad

objects. Guntrip's withdrawing self is somewhat similar

to Winnicott's concept of the hidden true self which is

protected by the compliant false self.

Guntrip, like Fairbairn and Winnicott, understands

aggression not as a primary instinct, but as a,

66.

"personal meaningful reaction to bad-object
relations, to a threat of the ego, aroused
initially by fear. Aggression is a defen-
sive anger in a situation in which the men-
ace is not too great for us to cope with.
Otherwise, aggression changes into frustra-
ted rage, hate, fear, and flight... Instead
of seeking explanations of aggression in
biology, we would do better to concentrate
on studying the manifold ways in which the
methods fo rearing children by parents who
themselves had to grow up in aggression-
saturated societies disturb the majority
of human beings from the start. (We must)
face the enormously complicated ways in
which fear, aggression, counter-aggression,
and more fear for centuries have been woven
into the minutest details of all social
organization." (Guntrip, 1971, p 137)

Interestingly, however eloquently Guntrip argues aggression

as not instinctually based, he does not attribute the ubi-

quitous reggressive flight of the individual infant to

defense but to primal capacity and longing for objectlessness.

How is it that a primal capacity was established in humans

before the response was required by present civilizations?

Aggression, for Guntrip, is not inherent, is not instinctual.

Yet, he says, the regressive flight form it is. What is of

importance for the present thesis, however, is that his

analysis of the human experience takes place within the

difficulties and realities of the infant's real relationships

with others.

Guntrip's understanding of the child's real responses to

his real family in the real world as the source of later

pathological   beliefs and behavior is in keeping with

the position of this paper. This position, which will be

developed more fully in later chapters, briefly stated here

is that the child's real, though immature, responses to

often inaccurately perceived actions of his real parents

are based upon an elaborate system of loyalty which is

based upon the infant and child's early empathic distress

for others and sense of omnipotent culpability for the

distress of those whom he loves. This sense of loyalty

to early pathogenic beliefs and memories is the foundation

for later clinical pathology.

68.

SUMMARY OF THE BRITISH SCHOOL

Each of these object relations theorists posits,
either explicitly or implicitly, a motivational thrust
toward interpersonal engagement, a "drive" toward object
relatedness. Experience with significant others becomes
important not simply because environmental influences are
powerful and the baby is responsive, but because the baby
is searching for certain kinds of experiences, primed for
specifically human engagement. These theories do not imply
that the innate features of the child's psyche are unim-
portant in human development. They simply say that these
innate features are not _in themselves_ the constituting
factor in creating psychopathology.

For a full discussion of this drive, or more precisely,
this instinct of the human infant for relatedness, that is,
this highly developed sensitivity to and capacity for being
with and internalizing another, the work of Michael Friedman
and Thomas Ogden will be presented and will establish, it is
hoped, a consistent theory of the altruistic instinct, as
well as the interplay of this instinct with environmental
factors in the creation of psychopathology.

69.

CHAPTER III

A reconceptualization of instinct based upon
the work of Thomas Ogden

A reconceptualization of altruism and guilt
based upon the theory of Michael Friedman

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What has come before in the previous sections is a
review of the psychoanalytic literature as it pertains
to the theories of instinct and primary relatedness.
Some of the literature is founded upon an understanding
of human nature as intrinsically pro-social. Certain
writers, such as Bowlby and Balint, place this pro-social
component within the the biology of humans, as part of
the phylogenetic inheritance and evolution of the species.
In other words, as Balint and Bowlby define instinct and
relatedness, the human infant instinctually seeks relations
with others. This instinctual relatedness is present at
birth, manifest in human behavior, and develops over time
into altruistic behavior and moral acts as defined by the
particular culture in which the infant lives.

Other authors, such as Winnicott, Fairbairn, and
Guntrip, speak of relatedness as a human capacity present
at birth and manifest in infant behavior. These writers
do not, however, attribute this human capacity to any
biologic container, to any pro-social instinct. They
simply and eloquently affirm that the human infant at its
outset is neither intrinsically autistic nor narcissistic.
Rather, he is able to take in, in however basic and prim-
itive form, the presence of another and to use this presence
in determining its own sense of self and of the world.

71.

When Freud spoke of the instinctual as the well-spring
of human behavior and of human desire he was clearly not
speaking of altruism or relatedness. For him, human
relatedness and pro-social behavior are either basically
egoistic or defensive in nature. Because of Freud's primary
and central role in the development of such concepts as
the unconscious, repression, and the role of instincts
in the human psyche, one cannot begin to understand intinct
theory, particularly a dualistic theory, without under-
standing the work of Freud. For this reason, the theory
of instinct which follows, will be presented in inter-
relation and contrast with the writings of Freud.

What follows now is a theory of human relatedness, based
upon the concept of a pro-social instinct. This pro-social
instinct is founded in part upon an organizing principle
of perception and behavior which in its universality can
also account for the many and varied perceptions, values,
and behaviors of human kind. This pro-social instinct
is posited in dynamic interplay, a dialectic, with an
egoistic instinct and disturbances in this balance of
perceptions by an individual are what contribute to much
of the pathology in Western and western-influenced cultures
today.

72.

Michael Friedman in "Toward a Reconceptualization of Guilt"(1985) builds a theory of psychopathology and, by inference, of human motivation, based upon the notion of a pro-social instinct. This instinct is postulated in addition to the self-preservative and sexual instinct, and possibly, in place of Freud's death instinct. What this pro-social instinct is, according to Friedman, is a pattern of

> "somewhat unlearned, universal tendencies to behave under certain circumstances in ways that benefit other members of one's species." (1985, p 503)

Altruism or pro-social behavior has as its intended purpose the benefit of another person, other than the self. This intended purpose may or may not be conscious. Advantage or disadvantage may or may not accrue to the performer of an altruistic act, but neither constitutes part of his intention. This notion of altruism is used by Friedman as a scientific and not as an ethical term. Here, Friedman says, he is clearly discussing not the goodness of human nature but, rather, the nature of human nature.

Altruistic behavior cannot be accounted for totally by a socialization process alone, and according to recent cognitive and social learning findings which Friedman cites

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in his discussion, it can be observed universally in very early infant behavior. (Chapter IV of the present work will present a more detailed account of these findings.) Friedman also cites the contributions of ethologists who speak of the phylogenetic inheritance of altruistic behavior as being consistent with the theory of natural selection. (Friedman, 1985, p 511) Their premise is that altruistic behavior was far more compatible with the survival of the human species than was aggressive, autonomous behavior.

Darwin himself was impressed by the importance of certain "co-operative" social behaviors and seemingly understood his evolutionary theory in much broader terms than many of his followers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including Freud. Darwin discusses altruistic behavior in evolutionalry terms (1859) in his description of the evolution of neuter insects. Bowlby and Friedman both cite recent investigations exploring the logical possibility that genotypic and phylogenetic structures mediating altruistic behavior in humans have evolved. (Wynne-Edwards, 1962; Trivers, 1971) Basically, these studies reaffirm that the theory of natural selection explains the evolutionary process in terms of species and not in terms of particular individuals and their descendants. A species fitness is measured not simply

by the genetic fitness of specific members, but more by
the collective fitness of members who share the same
genes. The protection and enhancement of the collective
gene pool, and not of the individual member, is the
measure of evolutionary fitness. As Bowlby explains the
process of evolution:

> "Once gene survival is recognized as the true
> criterion in terms of which the (adaptive)
> function of instinctive behavior is measured
> some outstanding problems evaporate. That
> some instinctive behavior is a function of
> direct and immediate benefit to kin is only
> to be expected. ... This means that altru-
> istic behavior springs from roots just as
> deep as does egoistic." (Bowlby, 1982,p 133)

The concept of reciprocal altruism (Trivers) explained
in Bowlby and mentioned in Friedman shows that natural
selection would even favor the evolution of certain
altruistic tendencies directed to related and even non-
related individuals. Friedman describes what this genetic
selection entails:

> "These models do not imply that there are
> specific sets of genes determining specific
> social behaviors, but merely that it is
> unlikely that we would have survived as a
> species unless we had inherited some
> structures mediating altruistic behavior,
> that is, some tendencies to help each other
> under certain circumstances." (1985, p 511)

Friedman's concept of the pro-social instinct is in
no way a restatement of the romantic view of the "noble

savage" concept, prevalent in the early 19th century.
Rather, these pro-social instincts are capable, as are
the self-preservative instincts, from which they are
partially derived, of utilizing all of human emotion,
and of being manifest in all of human behavior, including
its protective and aggressive forms, the interplay and
enmeshment of both. As a most obvious example, one can
cite warfare as allowing for the manifestation of conscience,
loyalty, empathy, altruism, on the one hand, and for aggres-
sion, death, and destruction, on the other.

Both Freud's and Melanie Klein's instinctual theories
are, according to Friedman, by definition, egoistic in that
the primary aim of the instincts is to discharge endogenously
generated accumulated pressures in the individual. Their
theories, therefore, preclude even the logical possibility
of pro-social instincts. Any benefit that might accrue
to another from an individual's behavior is considered to
be a result of ego defenses and sublimation or chance.
There is, by definition, no social or non-derivative altruism
in Freud's theory. Melanie Klein's theory is somewhat
different from Freud's. She acknowledges the actual phe-
nomenon of infant altruism but explains this phenomenon
in terms of the life and death instincts. In distinction
to Friedman's theory, Melanie Klein's altruism, although

phylogenetically programmed within the infant, has little
to do with the actual responses of the child to the real
world, to the real mother, but follows instead the course
of its phylogenetically programmed phantasies of mother and
the world. Friedman's theory, in distinction to Melanie
Klein's and in keeping with the British school of object
relations theorists, takes into account in a very serious
way the real relationships of the infant to his parents in
the establishment of the psychic structures of the indivi-
dual.

For Freud, there is no non-derivative love or object
relatedness in his theory. This is not to say, of course,
that Freud did not speak of love or object relatedness.
What Freud did not and could not do within his drive theory
was posit primary, non-derivative object relationships.
Consider again this passage from "On Narcissism" (1914):

> "Thus we form the idea of there being an
> original libidinal cathexis of the ego
> from which some is later given off to
> objects, but which fundamentally persists
> and is related to the object cathexis,
> much as the body of an amoeba is related
> to the pseudopoedia which it puts out."
> (SE 14, p 76)

Freud's position is clearly different from that which is
presented here in this paper. With Freud the child takes
itself, or some psychic part of itself, depending upon

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whose interpretation of this text one accepts, as a libidinal
object. Only after the child chooses himself, can he reach
out libidinally to and for others. The position of this
paper is that the child is instinctually primed for human
engagement within the context of the primary relationship.
Through this relationship the child learns to know and care
for itself.

Friedman discusses the text of Group Psychology and the
Analysis of the Ego as a means of understanding Freud's
position as to the nature of humans and of the relationship
of the individual to the primal group. This text was written
in 1921 and followed Beyond the Pleasure Principle wherein
Freud introduced the death instinct as explanation for the
phenomena of negative transference and clinical narcissism
which include masochism, melancholia, sadism, and aggression.
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego is in many ways
a continuation of the study and discussion of these aspects
of the personality.

In this text (1921), Freud considered the idea of pro-social
instincts in humans based upon the concept that, at core,
humans are herd animals.[1]   Freud ultimately rejected
this theory of the human herd instinct. For Freud,

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1. W. Trotter was an English sociologist at the turn of the
century who wrote Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. In
this text he postulated the idea of pro-social instincts in
humans based upon the premise that humans are hered animals.
Freud considered and rejected this hypothesis.

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the group is always alien to the individual, always lim-

iting the individual in his modes of libidinal expression.

He did talk of the group "will" and saw this "will" as

almost exclusively unconscious, exerting an unconscious

influence upon the individual. Interestingly, Freud

acknowledged that this unconscious group "will" develops

out of the narrower context of the family. The family,

however, for Freud, is the alien family,not the matrix of

the individual - the family of the father, the symbolic

father, Authority, and not the family of the mother-infant

dyad described by the British object relationists. Freud

clearly separates the individual from his group,so much

so, that in reading this text, one has no sense of a

dialectic or of an integral relationship between the indi-

vidual and the group. What we have in Freud, then, is an

individual created outside the context of the group.

Consider this passage:

> "For the individual outside the primitive
> group possessed his own continuity, his
> self-consciousness, his traditions and
> customs, his own particular functions
> and position, and he kept apart from
> his rivals." (SE 18, p 86)

One wonders at the contradictions within this statement.

What customs and traditions exist apart from the group?

What infant survives outside the mother-infant dyad?

Does not this mother-infant dyad mediate the past

and create the present within the context of all that it knows of the tradition and culture in which it is immersed? Certainly Freud accepts these ideas in general. Yet, how might civilization have come about as it has, solely and fundamentally based upon the individual's fear of and coercion by the group? But this is the view which Freud gave us. Rather than understanding the human animal as a herd animal, Freud said:

> "To correct Trotter's pronouncement that man is a herd animal (let us) assert that he is rather a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief."
> (SE 18, p 121)

The chief, Freud continued, ruled the horde through fear and coercion. He himself was above the law despite his despotic demanding exact obedience from his followers. One can only question Freud's hypothesis in this text. What is fundamentally individual about a human being, one might ask. Is it his capacity for language and symbolization which creates, or at least, enhances, a capacity for self-reflection which, in turn, gives him at times the illusion of complete autonomous individuality. Again, it can only be assumed that this sense of autonomy and individuality exists by virtue of the dialectic between this sense of autonomy and a sense of belonging, a realization of the "group". This is a dialectic somewhat similar to Winnicott's idea of contact and differentiation.

Although Freud rejected outright the existence of any

pro-social or altruistic instincts, he did recognize some-

thing of the individual's empathic capacity. Yet , Freud

saw empathy in its more negative and frightening forms, as

irrational and, therefore, out of the individual's control.

He discussed what appears to be empathy in terms of "sug-

gestibility" and "emotionalism", that is, emotionalism

unintegrated with the rational aspects of the personality.

Seemingly, empathy forces the individual to surrender his

individual will to the other, to the group:

> There is no doubt that something exists in
> all of us which, when, we become aware of
> signs of an emotion in someone else, tends
> to make us fall into the same emotion...
> suggestibility is actually an irreducible,
> primitive phenomenon." (SE 18, p 89)

Freud acknowledged that perhaps this suggestibility is

experienced out of love for the group members and that it

may be a love which involves self-sacrifice:

> "If an individual gives up his distinct-
> iveness in a group and lets other members
> influence him by suggestibility, perhaps,
> after all he does it 'ihness Zu Liebe'."
> (that is, "out of love for another.")
> (SE 18, p 92)

From these passages it can be assumed that Freud was

talking of empathy and altruism, and of an intrinsic,

irreducible capacity for altruism. Yet, Freud spoke only

of suggestibility and emotionalism. He tended to so

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generalize the phenomena of empathic responses that he

erased from them any definition as to what specifically

might these phenomena be of which he spoke.

Friedman suggests that Freud understood the general

significance of Trotter's hypothesis and rejected it

because it was so fundamentally incompatible with Freud's

own theory of motivaton. Freud stated that social feelings

are based upon the reversal of what first were hostile

feelings. (SE 18, p 1) As an example, the envy and jeal-

ousy of subsequent children by the eldest child, is changed

into a positively toned tie in the nature of an identification

with the once envied other(s). This change takes place,

according to Freud, because the child fears that his hostile

feelings will drive away the treasured other - his parent(s).

Freud's motivational system presents the older child with

being forced into an identification with his younger siblings

under threat of his   negative and fearful feelings and

beliefs. For Freud, then,identification is born out of

egoism (SE 18).

If one were to formulate a motivational theory based upon

egoism and altruism in dynamic interplay, envy might thus

be redefined as a complex reaction both of the child's own

sense, both real and fantasized, of the mother's real

limitations in providing for his psychic and physical devel-

opment. This sense is experienced by the child simultaneously

as frustration directed toward his siblings and himself,
and a desire for the mother. The resultant individual
experience is held in a dynamic balance and is defined by
each individual child according to the language and moti-
vational understanding of his family and culture. A redefin-
ition of envy along the lines of altruism and egoism,
necessitates that identification be born, at least in part,
of the belief and empathic understanding both of the mother's
own actual particular limited capacity to give, as well as
of the younger child's real needs and desires for the
mother. The older child, then, may be seen as resolving
a naturally occurring instinctual conflict between altru-
istically and egoistically motivated perceptions held in
dynamic tension. Identification, in this motivational sys-
tem, results from the mediation of both empathic and altruis-
tic motivation as well as egoistic desires.

Love for oneself, according to Freud, knows only one
barrier, that being love for others. (SE 18) Love alone
acts as a unifying factor in the sense that it brings about
a change from egoism to relatedness, and ultimately, to
altruism. What might it be - egoism without relatedness,
without empathy, without altruism - one wonders. Have we
not seen in the theories of Winnicott, Fairbairn, Guntrip,
and in the work of Bowlby, that love for oneself - egoism -

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is created by the love _of_ others, that is, by the mother loving the infant, and, in turn, enhanced by the love _for_ others, that is, by the infant loving others. Human social relatedness is a direct social experience, they say, and is present from birth. Friedman adds that human social relatedness exists for its own sake, is definable and observable, and is not adequately explained by attaching it to a physiological need such as the physical dependence of the infant upon the mother. The idea of initial relatedness stands in direct opposition to Freud's formulation of a path leading from identification by way of imitation to empathy which he posits in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego . (SE 18, p 121)

Arguably, pro-social behavior cannot be equated with loving. But pro-social behavior can begin, in its most fundamental form, as the initial acknowlegement of the other with an intrinsic sense of relatedness developing out of the primal bonding which carries with it the capacity for elaboration and growth into altruism, as we understand it, and for object love. Friedman does not agree with Freud that the infant's "egoism has taught him to love." (SE 14, p 204) Rather, Friedman argues that altruistic behavior,

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whether that of the child for his parent, or of the parent

for the child, is neither narcissistic nor psychic defense

but an evolution, an expansion and development of the initial

capacity for empathy that is actualized because of the

human infant's pro-social instinctual capacity. The logical

possibility for positing pro-social instincts requires a

concept of instinct somewhat different from Freud's "trieb"

and more similar to that utilized by ethology and semiotics.

Friedman suggests that Bowlby's conceptualization of instinct-

ual behavior as inborn capacities for organizing behavior

according to predictable and consistent patterns be employed.

To reiterate Bowlby's definition of instinctual behavior:

> "a. it follows a recognizable similar and
> predictable pattern in almost all members of a
> species or all members of one sex;
> b. it is not a simple response to a single
> stimulus but a sequence of behavior that usually
> runs a predictable course;
> c. certain of its usual consequences are of
> obvious value in contributing to the preservation
> of an individual or the continuity of the species;
> d. many examples of it develop even when all the
> ordinary opportunities for learning it are exiguous
> or absent." (Bowlby, 1969, 1982, p 38)

With this theoretical formulation, genetic endowment is

held in a dynamic interplay with environmental responses to

determine the individual characteristics of each social

being. The human being, then, can be said to be integrally

involved with his social and physical environment in what

is known as an open, dynamic system. This paradigm of

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instinct allows as well for the creation of a language of
relationships, of relatedness. Human psychological devel-
opment becomes of growth and elaboration, rather than one
of replacement or regression. The altruistic instinct
paradigm stands in sharp contrast to Freud's egoistic
model which has imbedded in its metapsychology the compet-
itive elements of human interaction - the drive toward
autonomy, separation, detachment, personal achieve-
ment, at the expense of the co-operative elements and the
search for union and relatedness. These latter character-
istics are acknowledged by Freud but they are, as we have
seen, attributed to the regressive and understood through
the narcissistic.

A SEMIOTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INSTINCT

Elaborating Bowlby's paradigm of instinctual organizational
patterns, is the semiotic instinct theory proposed by Thomas
Ogden (1985). The semiotic concept of instinct was origin-
ally applied as a reinterpretation of Melanie Klein's death
instinct. However, this conceptualization, as will be
shown, applies equally well to instinct theory as proposed
in this paper. Ogden talks of a psychological deep structure
and suggests that it is similar to Bowlby's formulations of
instinct in that it focuses upon the unlearned, universal,

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and supraindividual elements in attachment and separation
behavior. (Ogden, 1985, p 23) The deep structure theory
differs from Bowlby's in that it concentrates its focus
on the systems of generating and organizing meanings in
behavior. Bowlby, on the other hand, acknowledges and
discusses these organizational patterns, but in the context
of how they are observed and inferred through various
behaviors. Bowlby speaks of organizing patterns of
behavior. Ogden speaks of organized patterns of perceiving
behavior.

The deep structure theory views human motivation as more
than the search for both the reduction and expression of
libidinal and aggressive energy. Instead, it is built
upon the integral relationship between biology and mental
contents. What Ogden says of this relationship is par-
ticularly clear:

> "According to a semiotic model, a person with
> his system of meanings, some of which are shaped
> constitutionally, as reasons why he wants to
> (needs to, feels impelled to, feels he has no
> choice but to, feels with life-threatening
> urgency that he must, feel reluctantly that he
> should) act in a particular way. It is not the
> power of energic forces that constitutes moti-
> vation; it is the power of the logic of one's
> system of meanings." (Ogden, 1985, p 5)

By using the model of linguistic deep structure proposed
by Chomsky, Ogden defines psychological deep structure
(instinct) similarly. The notion of lingustic deep structure

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declares the impossibility of learning language by any
infant if it were necessary for him to begin the task by
deducing the morphological structure (syntax, grammar,
semantics) simply from hearing the phonemes (sound units)
of the language. It is only because the infant is phylo-
genetically endowed with a deep structure, an organizing
code, built into his sensory motor system that he is
equipped to discriminate between and organize groups of
sounds into what will become the syntactic and semantic
structure of a given language.

Characteristic of a linguistic code is that it is both
limiting and potentiating. The deep structure informs
the interpersonal experience of the infant in such a way
that the infant organizes the phonemes of language in
highly specific ways which then preclude other possibili-
ties. Some of these linguistic limitations might be attri-
butable to structure, while others might be attributable
to the environment. Ogden suggests that language is not
the only psychological achievement that is so organized.
Instinct, too, might be thought of not as a system of
inherited impulses (Freud) or inherited pre-formed ideas
(Melanie Klein), but as a code by which meaning is attri-
buted to experience along highly determined lines. Under-
lying the deep structure theory is the assumption that

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reality is never experienced absolutely free of some
organizing structure. Neither does this theory preclude
that experience cannot be realistically perceived, that
is, that these underlying organizational codes are so
strong, or so specific, that reality serves only to
develop pre-existing fantasies. Nor does it preclude the
role of culture in determining the actual interpretation
of the organization of the individual structure. It is
on these last points, in particular, that Ogden's under-
standing of a deep psychological structure would be
somewhat different from that which is being presented in
this paper. Ogden's account would see the underlying
structure exerting a far more specific interpretation
upon reality than is proposed here. A look to the
source of Ogden's ideas, to what Chomsky calls a
transitional account of linguistics, would be helpful.
Chomsky (1968) asserts that the semiotic and phonological
components of language have access to the output of the
core syntactic component, but not vice versa. What this
means in terms of a deep structure for instincts will be
explained here. Chomsky and Ogden differ from a general
systems theory which Bowlby offers as his foundation.
Seemingly, general systems theory proposes a more recipro-
cal relationship between the semantic and syntactic
structure: in psychological instinct theory this would

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translate into equal reciprocity between the instinctual and behavioral and cognitive structures. Chomsky's paradigm translated into instinct theory would state that although the deep structure (syntactic or instinct) level and the semantic or ideational levels interact, the core activities of the individual in the human species, that is, his instinct and capacity for altruism and egoism in all its vicissitudes, are never fundamentally altered. Altruism never becomes something other than altruism, or egoism something other than itself.

Psychological deep structure is the capacity unique to the human species to combine and recombine symbols in certain specific ways in order to create the variety of knowable and known human relationships. What one has, then, is a concept of instinct, both altruistic and egoistic, which is neutral,(Chomsky, 1968) equally valid as a description of behavioral and cognitive production and as a behavioral and cognitive comprehension.

It is impossible to produce a deep structure model of instincts (or language) separate and apart from the individual's beliefs, goals, points of view and world knowledge. In other words, the proof of an altruistic instinct exists by virtue of the universality of the existence of moral codes binding the individual to some culture or cultural beliefs outside of himself. That these moral codes differ

from culture to culture in no way disproves a pro-social instinct, no more than the vast variety of languages founded upon a syntanctic structure disproves a universal fundamental capacity, a universally occurring code for organizing human sounds into intelligible and communicable units of language.

A deep structure theory of instincts does provide a psychological code which prevents the infant from being immersed in a mass of disorganized and unorganizable stimuli that would be unknowable, and thus, would prevent the infant from interacting with his environment, be it natural or social. Ogden refers to deep structure as the biological container for the psychological being. Here, Ogden echoes the Lacanian account of instinct which is derived directly from Freud's definition of instinct (SE 17, p 108). According to Lacan and Freud instinct belongs to the biologic, joined to the psychical through the ideational representative. It is difficult to ascertain the source of this biological container, however, of which Ogden speaks. One might assume that encoded in the DNA of each individual is this deep structure, this psychological code, this organizing capacity. For the purposes of this paper, ascertaining the biological source is not essential. One poses the question simply because in referring to the psychological source of altruistic

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and egoistic behavior as biological in nature, one assumes

a somatic source, a source contained in time and space,

such as the capacity for organizing information.

The quality of this psychological deep structure, that is,
the capacity for generating psychological meaning, is both
unlearned and impersonal (neutral) and cannot, in itself,
reflect the individuality of the person. In this sense,
it is itself not psychological since it is neither a
conscious nor unconscious thought or feeling. As it is
part of the biology of the individual, and only psycho-
logically potentiating, it has the quality of reactivity
to the environment, of organizing the senses and compre-
hension of the individual. It is only through the gradual
development of the interpreting self, through the devel-
of the psychological individual, that personal meanings
are constructed. This interpreting self, Ogden says, is
the self which is able to differentiate itself both from
its symbols and from what it is symbolizing. This is a self
that has achieved the complex capacity of understanding
"the experiences of the self that are interpreted by the
self, since they are distinguished from the self." (Ogden,
1985, p 15) Again Ogden's thoughts closely parallel
Lacan's while at the same time are distinctly different.

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Whereas Lacan places the birth of the psychological indivi-
dual at the moment of birth into language, Ogden seems to
be positing a similar but separate birth for the individual
as that of the birth of language, one that precedes language,
but which is similarly organized.

Thus, applying the deep structure theory to the altruistic
instinct, one can understand the phenomenon of human related-
ness is biologically based, and most importantly, the
infant's inborn schemata allow the infant to construe his
experiences and behavior so as to search out relationships.
The infant, in a sense, is primed for specifically human
engagement: to find meaning in relatedness. Internaliz-
ation of objects, then, one might assume is the integral
relationship between the infant's internal experience
primed for human interaction and the actual "external"
reality of these relationships, each, in a fundamental
sense, creating the other.

GUILT REDEFINED

A model of an internal schemata compelling the infant to
develop and maintain his own sense of relatedness, separate
and distinct from other biological needs, for example,
separate from his complete dependence upon others for health
and nourishment, is the model of an altruistic instinct

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proposed in this paper. So positing this altruistic instinct, one is ready to develop a new concept of guilt founded upon empathy, more fitting with an altruistic motivation, and one would hope, more suited to better understand clinical phenomena.

Friedman's work (1985) is just such an attempt. For Friedman, guilt develops naturally out of empathy. This concept of guilt differs markedly and fundamentally from Freud's which defines guilt as arising out of fear.

Both Friedman and Freud acknowledge that guilt plays an essential role in the socialization of the human child.

Whereas for Freud guilt is achieved by way of identifications and defense, for Friedman guilt is directly derived from the altruistic instinct and is, therefore, primal. Obviously each defines guilt in accordance with his motivational theory. For Freud, the child views his parents as powerful authorities, frustrating, loving, cruel, or kind, but always powerful. Any real characteristics which might show the parents to be confused, sad, or hopeless, are apparently screened out by the child, according to Freud. His assumption is that the child's instinctual tendency is to aggressively satisfy his needs upon others, and that parents (civilization) are the opposing forces. Guilt, following from these assumptions, is,

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according to Freud, the anxiety experienced owing to a fear

of loss of love and eventually owing to the internalization

of the parental authority. In <u>Civilizaton and its Discontents</u>

Freud says:

> "First comes renunciation of instinct owing
> to fear of aggression by the external author-
> ity. (That is, of course, what fear of loss
> of love amounts to, for love is a protection
> against this punitive aggression.) After that
> comes the erection of an internal authority,
> and renunciation of instinct owing to fear
> of it - owing to fear of conscience."
> (SE 23, p 127)

So, with Freud, realistic anxiety precedes later, moral

anxiety. Guilt, for Freud, is the fear of an inner powerful

authority gleaned from one's experience with a frustrating

parent, representing the threats of that parent and dis-

torted and augmented by one's own aggression both for the

parent and for the self as agent of that which is bad.

Freud did, at other times, talk of the phenomenon of remorse

which arises out of the experience of ambivalently held

emotions of love and hate for the parental authority. Yet,

remorse stemming from love directly, is not fully developed

in Freud's theory.

The phenomenon which Freud calls guilt, Friedman calls

super-ego anxiety, a phenomeon of incalcuable importance.

This anxiety stemming from a fear of loss of love, whether

or not this fear is internalized, cannot be overlooked as

a motivation throughout one's lifetime. However, there

exists something other than fear of loss of love which is
not accounted for in Freud's definition of guilt. Accord-
ing to Friedman:

> "Freud's guilt is not the guilt of Lady Macbeth.
> It is not the guilt of a survivor of the Holo-
> caust (Niederland, 1961, 1981). It is not the
> guilt of a mother who believes she has damaged
> her child. ((1983, p 508)

Friedman defines guilt as originating from empathic
distress:

> (Guilt) "reflects a biological sensitivity to
> and concern for the needs of significant
> others, and arises when one believes one has
> injured or failed to help these others."
> (1983, p 508)

Thus, guilt can arise in the absence of parental severity,
not simply fueled by the child's own aggression directed
toward the self, but arising form the child's own empathy,
distorted by the child's undeveloped sense of causality,
fueled by his sense of omnipotent culpability.

Friedman bases his theory of instincts and motivation
on recent developments in cognitive and social learning
theory. These studies supply Friedman with the background
for positing an altruistic instinct based upon the theory
of natural selection, and state that early manifestations
of such an instinct can be observed in the very young infant.
What is observable in the infant is that in the presence of
another's distress, the infant will exhibit its own signs

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of physiological distress. The issue of whether the child comprehends the distress of another as coming from another or the self is not significant here. Of importance is the fact that the child responds to internal (his own) and external (another's) distress equally, that is, as if the child were experiencing the distress of another. The infant cna be said to be biologically primed for empathic responses. Founded upon the theory of natural selection and confirmed in empirical studies, guilt may thus be understood, not in terms of pathology but as an adaptive function augmenting pro-social motivation and behavior.

The psychoanalytic literature also contains many references to love, guilt, and relatedness as primary motivational forces. The works of Bush, Sampson, and Weiss will be summarized later in this paper. These theorists have provided Friedman with the psychoanalytic base for his model of a reconceptualization of guilt. The model states that human motivation is founded upon a biologically based system of altruism which is mediated by empathy. The system is a bipartite system consisting of (1.) empathic and sympathetic distress which motivates the empathically distressed person, and (2.) guilt, which is empathic distress with a cognitve component, the belief that one has caused the other's distress. Friedman redefines guilt along the lines

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that Bowlby proposes: defining emotions as appraisals.

> "Most of what are termed affects, feelings,
> and emotions are phases of an individual's
> intuitive appraisals either of his own
> organismic states and urges to act or of
> the succession of environmental situations
> in which he finds himself. (These appraising
> processes are often) experienced as feelings.
> (But) the fact that appraising processes are not
> always felt provides a clue to understanding the
> ... concept of unconscious feeling. Since these
> appraising processes may or may not be felt, it
> is the appraising processes rather than the
> feeling and emotion that require first
> attention." (Bowlby, 1982, p 104)

Along the lines that Bowlby suggests, Friedman defines

guilt:

> "Guilt is the appraisal, conscious or unconscious,
> of one's plans, thoughts, actions, etc., as dam-
> aging, through commission or omission, to someone
> for whom one feels responsible."
> (Friedman, 1985, p 529)

Feeling responsible, according to Friedman, is simply

the ability to respond empathically with an empathically

based motivation to help. Obviously, one's sense of

responsibility depends upon (1.) the actual relationship

one has with the distressed, (2.) as well as, one's capacity

for understanding the distress of the other. Actual or

symbolic instances of relationships with nuclear family

members carry a high degree of feeling responsible.

Understanding emotions as appraisals has particular sig-

nificance for Friedman. His definition of guilt is based

upon the notion that it is the person's belief that he has

harmed or may harm someone which contributes to his sense

of guilt. This belief, often based upon very early and immature appraisals of a particular family situation or family member, is often inaccurate. And, it is these inaccurate, immature, and irrational beliefs about the consequences of an individual's hopes, desires, thoughts, and actions that are important in the clinical manifestations of guilt in the individual.

This model of guilt adopted by Friedman has three components: an affective, a cognitive, and a motivational. The affective content consists of a sense of empathic distress, coupled with what might be described as depressive anxiety. This is the depressive anxiety which Melanie Klein describes - a feeling of distress, accompanying the belief that one has harmed a loved object or internal representation of the object (Klein, 1964). The cognitive content of guilt consists of the belief that something of one's person is damaging to a person one feels responsible toward. The motivational component of guilt, not previously discussed, consists of a plan to:

    (a)   avoid action believed dangerous or damaging;

    (b)   make reparation either before, after, or in lieu of action believed dangerous or damaging;

    (c)   defend against the guilt.

Friedman concentrates his discussion on the child's concern

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and empathy for and loyalty to his parents that, in some
cases, lead to guilt over harming his parents. For Friedman,
as with all clinicians, his emphasis reflects his interest
in psychopathology and does not assume that the child's
empathic tie to his parent(s) is greater than that of the
parent(s) to the child.

   Traditional theory reflects the belief that it is to the
child's advantage to be loyal and devoted to the parents who
will in turn insure that he will receive the care and support
he needs to survive and thrive. This is egoistically
motivated loyalty, and as a motivational factor, is not
disregarded by Friedman. However, his concern is for
analyzing altruistically motivated loyalty. Herein,
Friedman says, lie the child's deepest experience and most
profound conscious and unconscious intentions, including
his empathy for and devotion to his family, his wish to
help them, and his guilt if he believes he has harmed them.

   "To a degree not generally realized psychopathologies
are pathologies of loyalty." (Friedman, 1985, p 530)
Psychopathology, says Friedman, is a renunciation of normal
developmental goals by the child because these goals are
judged by the child to be dangerous to others or to himself.
Dangers to the self include fear of the loss of love and
protection, characterized by feelings of rejection, abandon-

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ment, shame, or physical abuse. When this fear is internalized and sensed as anxiety it is what Friedman calls super-ego anxiety. Super-ego anxiety is almost always experienced in combination with what Friedman calls altruistically motivated guilt. Dangers to others are experienced when the child "senses" and comes to believe that his normal goals, for example, his ability to love and to work effectively, will harm his parent(s) or other family members. The child will tend to renounce these goals if he should perceive them to be dangerous through an empathic understanding. By such a renunciation, he hopes to avoid a sense of guilt.

> "The child will be motivated to renounce his
> goal whether or not he believes, in addition,
> that the damaged parent will retaliate by
> rejecting, attacking, humiliating him, etc...
> or that by virtue of being damaged the parent
> will no longer be able to function as an ade-
> quate parent, that is, that he will lose a
> needed relationship." (Friedman, 1985, p 531)

In other words, although the child may simultaneously experience super-ego anxiety and altruistically motivated guilt, they are actually two distinctly different phenomena. At times, however, they may be distinct, but inseparable. Interestingly, when the child renounces his individual goals, he tends to identify with the dysfunctional parental values. The child then becomes actively committed to preserving his parents' narcissistically invested self-illusions. These

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illusions in turn become a component of identification.
The child will then repress aspects of his own personality
in order to reflect what he believes is necessary to do for
his parent's sake. This is an unconscious process and is
similar to that which Winnicott discusses in his notion of
the true and false self. What remains hidden and, in a very
deep sense, sacrificed is the child's own ability and con-
fidence in reality testing; what is repressed is his own
personal distress, rage, and frustration in being prevented
from developing 'real' relationships with his parents,
siblings, and eventually with others.

One wonders if Friedman is establishing a causal relation-
ship between the parents' illusions and the child's pathology.
This interpretation of familial events, although seemingly
accurate, tends to be unidimensional. Except in extreme
cases, parents are rarely simply defective, corrupt, sadis-
tic, abusive, neglectful, and rejecting, but rather are
themselves suffering from some pathological belief and guilt.
They, too, have sacrificed their own real opportunities
for healthier relationships and committments to their fam-
ilies. What is passed on to the children of these parents,
what becomes a family legacy, might be said to be not sim-
ply guilt, but how that guilt is dealt with, whether through

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narcissistic defense, depression, externalization, or sacrifice.

At the base of many of these pathological identifications, Friedman says, is a particular form of guilt called survivor guilt. This form of guilt is the guilt of omission and is experienced when one believes that one could have helped but failed to help a loved one. The greater the discrepancy between one's perceived fate and the perceived fate of family members whom one has failed to help, the greater the distress and the more profound one's guilt. A person is vulnerable to survivor guilt throughout his life, and can result from any traumatic occurrence befalling a family member. As an example, the survivors of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany suffered from a form of survivor guilt, believing themselves in some way responsible for the death of their loved ones by virtue of their own survival.

Children's vulnerability to parents' pathological beliefs has to do with the normal investiture of parents by children with learning how to understand the world. Actual blame, whether conscious or unconscious, and real punishment by the parents inflicted on the child reinforce the child's already powerful sense of guilt. The literature contains references to the findings that traumas created by parents to the child or by circumstances outside the

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family to the family may often be viewed by the child as caused by him. With such an occurrence, guilt will ensue. This guilt Friedman sees as a defense against the anxiety which accompanies the real perception of the child's world as arbitrary. Here Friedman echoes the thinking of Fairbairn who describes the clinical phenomenon of delinquent behavior as arising out of the child's very real need to see the world ruled by good, non-arbitrary parents and authorities.

The incidence of self-destructive behavior and self-punishment is attributed by Friedman to a defense against the empathic component of guilt: by sharing the fate of the person(s) one believes one has hurt or failed to help one is able to diminish one's empathic distress and thus repress one's sense of guilt and deny what the cognitive component of guilt demands - that one is responsible. This defense, as with others, serves ultimately only to reinforce the defense which in this case is the self-destructive behavior. Where the energy is focused upon the self as victim and away from the self as offender, one is freed for a time from the burden of guilt. This notion is somewhat akin to Melanie Klein's idea of manic reparation, a defense against depressive anxiety: if one suffers continuously, one might ultimately repair the damage inflicted upon the loved one.

Friedman, in stressing the empathic distress of the child,
can also account for another real source of distress
experienced by the child - the distress which Harold Searles
describes so poignantly in his work with and writing about
schizophrenics.

> "I presented a hypothesis that deeply denied
> positive feelings are the most powerful
> determinants of the relationship between
> the schizophrenic and his mother, and of the
> development and maintainance of the patient's
> illness ... I describe the mother's poorly
> integrated personality structure, her fears
> of her own love for the child, her low self-
> esteem, and her transference to him of a
> whelter of feelings, consisting basically
> in thwarted love, from her own childhood
> relationship with her mother. I traced the
> consequent frustration of her child's -
> that patient's - need to give love openly to
> his mother, and his expressing this love in
> a therefore disguised, but nonetheless
> wholehearted fashion. He sacrifices his
> potential individuality in a dedicated
> effort to preserve her precarious inte-
> gration, through introjecting the dissociated
> components of her personality, components
> which become distortedly personified, and
> in a sense crystalized, in the schizophrenic
> illness." (Searles, 1965, p 521)

Distress, according to Searles, arises in the child because
he believes he is incapable of helping the parent. Although
Searles does not necessarily assume, as does an altruistic-
ally motivated theory as is here presented, that the pre-
schizophrenic child feels responsible for having caused the
mother's suffering and damage, he does believe that the
child feels deeply responsible for curing the mother, and
consequently suffers from unconscious lifelong guilt at having

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failed in his curative efforts. Searles describes this interaction as that of the child's gift of love, sacrifice, being rejected by the mother. A sense of frustration, of futility, is created by the frustrated attempts at helping the rejecting and refusing parent. If the child's attempts at acting empathically and helpfully are blocked and narcissistically diminished by the parent, then the child's anxiety and guilt will rise. If the ensuing anxiety and guilt are so great as to prevent the child from developing any sense of self and autonomy, the child will develop the clinical manifestation of schizophrenia. However, with a lessened response of anxiety and guilt, the child will then continue in this pattern of self-defeating behavior in an attempt to maintain the parent's pathogenic beliefs about the child, about the parent himself, about the world in general regardless of the distress caused to the child engendered by the pathogenic belief. The child's love for and loyalty to his psychologically damaged mother, according to Searles, is a major motivation force in the development of a life-long, crippling guilt for not being able to help her. Although Searles places the child's real feelings of love and loyalty and sacrifice within the mother-infant dyad, Friedman and others, although acknowledging the uniqueness and centrality of this relationship, extend these normal

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though pathogenic responses to both parents and siblings.
In other words, the child can feel responsible and guilty
for a variety of occurrences within the family and affecting
various family members.

A child's aggressive, destructive, or hostile wishes
toward his parents and siblings, seemingly born out of the
frustration of the real relationships, suggested by the
British object relationists, are not a necessary condition
for the developmepnt of his guilt, although these hostile
and destructive fantasies will certainly contribute to his
sense of guilt. In other words, oedipal guilt as defined
by Freud, Friedman might redefine as the child's own reluc-
tance to experience and exhibit his own personal and sexual
strength for fear of and guilt over damaging the father.
The weaker the father in the child's unconscious estimation,
and not the stronger, the greater the oedipal guilt. This
theory does not base oedipal guilt solely upon the strength
of the child's aggressive wishes.

Oedipal guilt, for Friedman, is but one of a variety of
forms of guilt and does not occupy the singularly unique and
central position in his theory as it does in classical
Freudian theory. Friedman suggests that the variety and
forms of guilt be classified into general developmental
categories.

"An infant or child may come to experience his
normal need for nurturance and his normal need
tó make contact with his mother as úpsetting to
her. The guilt over these needs or intentions
is in some sense earlier than the guilt a child
might experience for wanting to separate from
his mother. Similarly, the guilt over wanting
to separate from mother may be in some sense
earlier than the guilt over competing with
father for mother's affection."
(Friedman, 1985, p 537)

On the other hand, Friedman cautions that any developmental

categories be viewed as life-long issues, rather than discreet

stages. As an example, the vague, though chronic, empathic

distress experienced by the infant when his search for nurtu-

rance and relatedness is perceived as distressing to his

mother would be qualitatively different from the empathic

distress and accompanying guilt which an older child may

experience when he perceives his normal desire to autonomously

puruse his own goals as distressing to his parent(s) and

causing them to be gravely depressed. It would be difficult

to quickly access, however, which example would carry the

more profound effect upon the child's developing sense

of causality and guilt.

Not only are the developmental categories of guilt life-

long issues, but added to their complexity is the interweav-

ing of altruistic and egoistic motivation with the impor-

tance of each, over time, undergoing qualitative changes.

Assuming that the sense of self is created within the matrix

of the familial relationship and assuming that the sense of

self is stable over time, without some conscious inter-
ception, then separation from the matrix will be accom-
panied by feelings of disconnnectedness from the other, as
well as concern for the effects on the well-being of the
other. Each relationship is comprised of both altruistic
and egoistic elements. These elements will vary across
relationships and across time even within a specific
relationship. As an example:

> "A young child who attempts to resist compliance
> with a parent's devaluing view of him may exper-
> ience this feeling of disconnectedness as a
> terror of isolation or abandonment, that is, he
> may be motivated to comply with his parents'
> devaluation largely for egoistic reasons. How-
> ever, for a grown man who has experienced suc-
> cess in his work and intimate relationships,
> fear of disconnectedness or isolation may be a
> minor element in his motivation for continued
> identifications and compliance with early ob-
> jects. His continuing attachment to his par-
> ents and identification with their dysfunctional
> values and life style is likely to be motivated
> by guilt over abandoning them." (1985, p 541)

The perspective of this chapter, indeed of this thesis,
is that psychopathology is the renunciation of normal
developmental goals by an individual because these goals
come to be perceived by the individual as dangerous. This
danger is instinctually and most often unconsciously exper-
ienced by the individual. If one were to assume that
intrinsic to the life force of living beings is the preser-
vation of life and that this preservation of life in humans

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is instinctually guided by egoistic, that is, self and altruistic instincts, then one might conceive of the dangers to life being understood as falling into two broad fundamentally similar and dialectically joined categories: danger to the self and dnager to others to whom one feels significantly attached.

Perceived dangers to the self are fairly well understood and have been explicated in the psychoanalytic literature. Generally speaking, fear of loss of love and an ensuing dread of abandonment and isolation are what constitute danger to the self. Friedman understands these internalized fears of danger to the self to be motivated by what he calls super-ego anxiety.

Perceived danger to others is often accompanied by a perception of causality and fault being centered in the self. This internalized fear of the self causing danger to others constitutes a sense of guilt, according to Friedman and others who have studied empathy, guilt, and altruism. Although guilt is accompanied by and experienced simultaneously with super-ego anxiety, it is important in determining a person's motivation, to understand that guilt and super-ego anxiety are actually separate motivational systems stemming from separate instinctual systems - egoism and altruism.

As we will see in Chapter IV the child is instinctually
primed for empathic responses. As these empathic responses
develop into altruistic acts and moral codes we can begin
to comprehend how it is that Friedman states:

> "To a degree not generally realized
> psychopathologies are pathologies of
> loyalty."   (1985, p 530)

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CHAPTER   IV

Social and cognitive learning theories and
studies on the early manifestations in
infant and child development of pro-social
behavior and development.

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What has been set forth prior to this chapter is a review of the psychoanalytic literature which defines and supports a pro-social instinct. It defines that instinct as the infant's drive toward relatedness, the infant's search for the other from which (this paper assumes) also stems those unlearned universal tendencies to behave under certain circumstances in ways that benefit other members of one's group. It understands the human infant as essentially social in nature as having a psychological deep structure which gives meaning to reality, allowing the human infant to develop in such ways as to perceive himself as essentially belonging to and acknowledging himself in relation to others. At the same time this deep structure so constructs the inner reality of the developing infant to allow him to create personal meanings, to interpret individually, his social, natural, and psychological environment, his own personal relationship to his world. That this personal meaning is essentially created out of the meaning that the mother, parents, family, culture impart both consciously and unconsciously to the child within the relationship is unquestionably so, and is further evidence of the social nature of the individual. Thus is established the I-Thou dialectic, described by, among many, Jacques Lacan who

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defines the individual within a context of the other by

mutual opposition and, it might correctly be added,

dialectically, by their mutual co-operation - the mother

shaping and imparting meaning for the child to his

responses and of the child's capacity to learn and

ultimately to create his own meaning. The infant then is

fundamentally and, some say, instinctually equipped to be

a social being. One does not socialize a child anymore

than one photosynthesizes a plant; rather, the process

is in the nature of the species.(Kaye, 1982) What is

necessary at this point is a brief presentation of the

literature describing and interpreting the empirical

evidence supporting a pro-social instinct position.

The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview

of the large body of experimental data supporting the

theory of an independent altruistic motivational system.

Hoffman (1982, 1984) formulated a theoretical model of

the work in this field citing studies which demonstrate

the biological (automatic quality) basis for empathy in

newborns and young children. There is, in addition to

Hoffman's own studies and model of altruism, a growing

body of data substantiating the very early development

of empathic and altruistic responses from which the con-

clusion may be drawn that such responses are not entirely

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learned.

Classical psychoanalytic and cognitive development theory neither predict nor discuss the manifestations of altruistc behavior occurring before the age of five years. Although attempts have been made to scientifically study and quantify the development of altruistic behavior and moral judgment (Piaget, Kohlberg), it is only recently that moral judgment has been studied in terms of an altruistic motivational system. Nancy Eisenberg (1982, 1986) and others document the occurrence of altruistic behavior in early pre-school children. Social learning theory might account for some pro-social behavior on the basis of imitation and reinforcement contingencies but it would be difficult to explain the universal appearance of altruistic tendencies and behavior in very young children (one and two year olds) through social learning theory alone.

It is clear from a perusal of the current literature on pro-social behavior that there does not exist any singular definition of pro-social or altruistic behavior. Depending upon one's working definition of altruism which will be determined by one's orientation - for example, cognitivists will stress cognitive and moral understanding and internal motives; social learning theorists will discuss overt observable behaviors - somewhat different criteria for study will be used and different results will be attained.

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Examples of the various definitions of altruism currently

being utilized in the study of pro-social behavior and

motivation (Eisenberg, 1982) follow:

> Bar-Tal and Raviv:
> "Altruism ... at the highest level of quality
> is defined as voluntary and intentional behavior
> carried out for its own end to benefit a person,
> as a result of moral conviction in justice and
> without expectations for external rewards."
> (p 200)
>
> Cialdini, Kenrick, and Baumann:
> "By altruism, we refer to actions taken to benefit
> another for reasons other than extrinsic reward."
> (p 340)
>
> Krebs:
> Altruism is the "willingness to sacrifice one's
> own welfare for the sake of another." (p 54)
>
> Hoffman:
> Altruism "which may be defined generally as
> behavior such as helping and sharing that promotes
> the welfare of others without conscious concern
> for one's own self-interest." (p 281)
>
> Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow:
> "Altruism is formally defined as regard for or
> devotion to the interests of others." (p 109)

What all definitions hold in common is that altruistic or

pro-social behaviors - helping, sharing, intentional and

voluntary positive behavior - stem from a fundamental capacity

and inclination toward human social relatedness. What the

differences in definition account for is a qualitative

difference in an individual's pro-social behavior at different

ages and periods of cognitve development in an individual's

life.

In a study conducted by Eisenberg-Berg and Neal (1979) and cited in Eisenberg (1982) children's reasoning about their naturally occurring positive (altruistic) behaviors was explored. This study differs from previous similar studies (most notably, Kohlberg, 1969)[1.] in that the children's pro-social behavior and motivation were not instigated by adults. According to their data, children most frequently explained their own pro-social behavior with reference to the needs of others, that is, as simple expressions of empathic reasoning, as well as to pragmatic concerns. Authority and punishment reasoning analogous to Kohlberg's Stage I (the reader is referred to the included charts in the Appendix, Chapter IV) reasoning was not used by any of the children. Infrequently, the children verbalized hedonistic approval and stereotypic justifications.

Eisenberg (1982) concludes from a review of the data of Eisenberg-Berg and Neal and of Kohlberg that their research was of two distinct judgments: the former of pro-social

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1. This paper assumes a basic familiarity with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg in the field of moral judgment (1969, 1971) by the reader. For a review of Kohlberg's moral stage theory please see the attached chart in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. A chart of pro-social motivation based judgment compiled by Eisenberg-Berg (1979) is also included.

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moral judgment, and the latter of prohibition oriented moral
judgment. Here, we can see the ideas of Friedman reflected
in this division: Kohlberg's research is defined by a
motivational system much like Freud's, a system of super-ego
anxiety; and Eisenberg-Berg's is a motivational system defined
by guilt, as Friedman would define it. Eisenberg concludes
that each of these forms of judgments (which can be defined
as egoistic or altruistic judgments) differ in sequence in
development.[2.] In fact, Eisenberg states that Kohlberg's
Stage I authority and punishment orientation is virtually
absent in pre-school children and that the pro-social reasoning
of these children is more advanced than Kohlberg's Stage I
explanation. Children, in effect, function at a Stage III
level on Kohlberg's scale, that is, a needs oriented, empathic
moral judgment.

Eisenberg accounts for these differences in research find-
ings between Kohlberg and Eisenberg-Berg by their differences
in philosophical orientation and emphasis. The psychological
and psychoanalytic literatures in past years have emphasized
the egoistic, aggressive aspects of human behavior coupled
with an individual's capacity to resist such instinctual
impulses and temptations. This orientation has its obvious

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2. The reader must remember that all research referred to in
   this chapter has been carried out using subjects of North
   American, white, middle-class background.

importance in understanding human social interaction. The

study of positive, pro-social beliefs and behavior and its

roots and determinants have as a result been an area of

considerable neglect. The literature has, in a great sense,

been reflective of Freud's idea that one's sense of

justice and its roots stem from denial and reaction-formation

solely:

> "Social justice means that we deny ourselves
> many things so that others may have to do
> without them as well, or what is the same,
> they may not be able to ask for them. This
> demand for equality is the root of social
> conscience and the sense of duty."
> (Freud, SE 18, p 121)

Clearly, what is lacking in this understanding of human social

motivation is what Eisenberg calls an understanding of pro-

social motivation stemming from roots as basic and compul-

sory to human behavior are egoistic.   In other words,

human motivation might be better understood in terms of an

altruistic instinct in counterbalance to an egoistic.

Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow (1979) as published in Eisen-

berg (1982) report that children as young as twelve months

exhibit strong reactions to distress in others (indicating

a human instinctual-visceral component) and that the prototype

for later reactions to the emotional distress of others can

be seen as early as two years of age (indicating, in part,

an acquired understanding of one's responses as well as the

needs of others). The researchers' intent in this study was

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in ascertaining the origin and ontogenesis of human altruistic behaviors. They proceed from the assumption that the altruist is responding to a state of distress (real or perceived) in the victim. (Eisenberg, 1982, p 135) Their findings, too, are clearly different from those of Kohlberg, and in fact, they conclude that more than a stage theory approach is necessary for a full understanding of altruism and pro-social behavior in individuals. Their conclusions suggest a combination of instinctual tendencies and the early child environment play the important roles in an individual's ability to act altruistically. In other words, what begins as an undifferentiated physical response of the human infant soon becomes a psychological phenomenon with roots as unconscious as any other instinctually and egoistically derived human perceptions, beliefs, desires, and behavior.

Grusec (Eisenberg, 1982, p 163), working also in the mode of understanding altruism in its instinctual and cognitive components cites the findings of her studies (Grusec and Kuczynski, 1980) which suggest a strong re tionship between the acceptance of offers of help and the number of such offers made. Successful altruistic offers of help contributed to the child's overall feelings of competence and mastery which in turn motivated him to perform other such acts. Thus, one can see the interplay, reciprocity, dialectic between

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altruism and egoism. What begins as a visceral response
to the distress of another (proto-altruism) can lead to the
carrying out of a helpful action in the service of that
other which in turn will have the benefit of contributing
to the altruist's sense of self and self-mastery. One is
reminded here of Searles work with schizophrenics and his
clinical observations that it is the repeated offers of
love by the child and denied and rebuffed by the mother
which lead to the schizophrenic child's denial and lack of
self-mastery and self-worth.

Much of the current literature on pro-social behavior and
motivation accepts the premise that empathy, though biologi-
ically, viscerally, affectively based, develops over time
into qualitatively different forms of behavior. Thus, the
empathic distress of a one year old child and the subsequent
understanding of his distress and mode of response by the
child will be qualitatively different from that of the
adult mother of an infant who is experiencing distress. It
is not the purpose of this paper to equate the mature moral
judgment of an empathically motivated adult with the seem-
ingly undifferentiated empathic distress of a newborn exper-
iencing the distress of another. Yet, the intent of the
current literature and of this paper is to explicitly
demonstrate the instinctual underpinnings for pro-soical
behavior, and how those underpinnings are manifest first

through the affective (visceral), and developing over time

into the merger of the cognitive and affective aspects of

pro-social behavior.

Consider Kagan's remarks on the necessity of understanding

the pro-social (emotional, affective) foundation for social

and moral structures:

> "We can write or talk about the cognitve
> and visceral elements separately, but the
> phenomenon is the coherence of these events.
> Oriental philosophers have argued that affects
> form the basis for whatever moral standards
> are universal. If humans did not possess
> the ability for certain emotional states,
> moral standards might be even more diverse
> and relativistic then they appear to be
> in this era of ideological tolerance for
> ethical pluralism."
> (Kagan, 1984, in Izard, Kagan, and Zajonc,
> 1984, p 69)

Here, we can define morality from the above passage as

the guilding principles for proper relations among people

and in so doing relate the above passage to pro-social

behavior and its instinctual foundation.

Martin Hoffman's theory of empathy and guilt (1982, 1984)

forms the foundation for much of Friedman's clinical model

of an altruistic instinct and reconceptualization of guilt.

(1985) Basically, Hoffman describes an instinctual human

response system which must be both the foundation for and

channeled by the perceptual and cognitive structures of the

individual (as the deep structure theory of instincts des-

cribes, in Chapter III of this paper). Obviously, says

Hoffman, altruistic instincts and behavior must be weighed against an individual's egoistic instincts and responses in such a way as to ultimately provide the possibility of some resolution in a particular situation. (Hoffman, in Izard, et al., 1984, p 103)

Hoffman describes empathy as in part an affective response more appropriate to someone else's situation than to one's own (1982, p 281). This visceral and vicarious response of one for another underlies a mature form of empathy which includes a cognitive awareness of another's personal internal state (thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions). Hoffman's own study (Sagi and Hoffman, 1976) of the empathic distress of newborns substantiates this theoretical premise. The study demonstrates that one day old infants react to the distress cries of other infants with cries that are indistinguishable from the cries of infants who are in actual distress, and are different from the infants' reactions to equally loud and startling, but non-human sounds. Hoffman cites the work of Bourke (1971) which suggests that children under the age of eighteen months are able, with the most general feedback, to assess the specific needs of another person even when these needs differ from their own. These assessments of another's internal state will, with good enough care, change and mature over time, reflecting the individual's cognitive maturity,

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particularly his maturing sense of the other.

Hoffman's empathic arousal system includes several (6)

modes of empathic arousal, all of which have involuntary,

visceral components.

> "As humans we may involuntarily and forcefully
> experience others' emotional states rather
> than the emotional states pertinent and
> appropriate to our own situation. We are
> built in such a way that distress will
> often be contingent not on our own but on
> someone else's painful experience."
> (Hoffman, 1984, p 112)

Hoffman's six modes of arousal range from the two day old

infant's reactive cry to complex cognitive and visceral

responses of symbolic (language) associations and consciously

mediated role-taking abilities.

> "When one encounters someone in pain, danger,
> discomfort, one is exposed to a network of
> information, about the other, situational cues,
> and knowledge one has about the other's
> general affective experience beyond the
> immedate situation. These sources of infor-
> mation are assumed to be processed differently.
> Empathy aroused by non-verbal and situational
> cues is expected to be mediated by the largely
> involuntary, cognitively 'shallow' processing
> modes. Empathy aroused by verbal messages
> from the victim, on the other hand or by one's
> knowledge about the victim, requires more
> complex processes such as semantic interpre-
> tation and imaging oneself in the victim's place.
> What may be defined as an empathic response
> for a very young child may thus involve
> relatively simple levels of processing of
> visual or auditory cues in the immediate
> situation, whereas mature empathizers may,
> in addition, respond in terms of semantic
> meanings of stimuli and representations of
> events beyond the situation."
> (Hoffman, 1984, in Izard, et al., 1984)

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Hoffman's paradigm of empathy distinguishes four developmental levels:

1. Global empathy is experienced through the first year of life before the child has a fully differentiated sense of self and other, e.g., the reactive cry of the newborn to a sign of distress in another;

2. Egocentric empathy is characteristic of the child who has achieved 'person permanence' to some degree but is lacking a fully differentiated experience of the self's and the other's internal experiences, e.g., the child who offers his toy or his blanket to ease another's distress;

3. Empathy for another's feelings parallels the child's more differentiated sense that others have inner states independent of his own;

4. Empathy for another's general plight signals the child's recognition that others have lives separate and beyond the immediately perceived situation. (Hoffman, 1982)

As the child develops cognitively, his capacity for empathic response also changes from distress to help, says Hoffman. Said differently, the child's responses develop from a parallel to a reciprocal style of responding. This shift signals a shift from conscious concern for the self and relief of distress to a desire to help because of compassion for the other. It is important to remember that although Hoffman

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has formulated his theory of pro-social behavior in terms
of developmental levels, he does not mean to imply that this
empathic development may be accounted for by social learn-
ing. Rather, it would be better to keep in mind still, the
linguistic model of deep structure and language development
as a way of understanding Hoffman's theory.

With the development of cognitive skills comes an under-
standing of human behavior in terms of causal attribution
which plays an important role in empathic distress and
symbolic response. Hoffman emphasizes the magnitude and
complexity of the cognitive skills which the child needs in
order to establish causal attribution in the behavior of
others whom he observes as well as of his own behavior.
Following from Hoffman's theory of empathy and causal attri-
bution to behavior is his concept of guilt. According to this
theory, which carries particular significance for clinicians:

> "It seems reasonable to assume, when one
> feels empathic distress, that if the cues
> indicate that one has caused the victim's
> distress one's empathic distress will be
> transformed by the self-blame attribution
> into a feeling of guilt. That is, the
> temporal conjunction of empathy for someone
> in distress and the attribution of one's
> own responsibility for that distress will
> produce guilt." (1982, p 297)

Hoffman does not consider guilt as necessarily in itself
pathological. Rather, it is an interpersonal experience and
he discusses its adaptive function as a form of pro-social

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motivation. In disposing a person to avoid harm to others and to make reparation if he does, guilt adds an additional biologically based pro-social motive to those of empathic and sympathetic distress.

Guilt has three components:

1. an affective: empathic distress as well as the painful feeling of dis-esteem for the self which, if not attended to, may promote a sense of being a worthless person;

2. a cognitive: belief that one has caused the distress of another;

3. a motivational: disposition to make reparation for causing the distress.

Children, according to Hoffman, are predisposed to developing causal attribution to and assigning motives to observable behavior of which blame attribution is one form. Self-blame attribution is obviously the cogntive component of guilt. Even though mature interpersonal guilt carries with it a sense of choice, Hoffman explains that, very early, children respond to simple expressions of pain of the other experiencing distress, with a rudimentary guilt feeling even without a sense of causal agency. With a fuller sense of self and cognitive development, children may respond with empathic distress, transformed into guilt if they perceive their own actions as causing the hurt to another. Once children become aware of different internal states of others, they may exper-

ence guilt over, what Hoffman calls, the "plight"(a long term affective state) of others if they should perceive themselves responsible for the others' plight. At some point in children's development the awareness alone of being the cause of another's plight may be enough to feel guilty without them sensing their own empathic distress. Empathic distress may be a necessary factor in the development of guilt, but, says Hoffman, it may not be an inevitable accompaniment of guilt. (Hoffman, 1984)

There seems to be a transitional time in the congition of children that occurs somewhere before an understanding of the complexities of cause, choice, and degree is achieved. Though children may be confused about who is the causal agent, they may nevertheless feel something like guilt, even if they are totally innocent. The guilt-like responses observed in some of Zahn-Waxler's et al. (1979) sample of fifteen to eighteen month old infants may be illustrative of this level of cognitive development and guilt (as reported by Hoffman, in Eisenberg, 1982, p 298) Perhaps more importantly, their data suggest a rudimentary sense of being responsible for an act that predates the cognitive requisites for guilt, e.g., a sense of having choices.

Why should children feel they are to blame?, asks Hoffman.

"I suggest that they feel culpable because
of their sense of omnipotence, which together
with their cognitive limitations (indeed,
omnipotence is created out of these cognitive
limitations) lead them to view all things
associated with their actions as caused by
them." (Parenthesis, this paper) (Hoffman,
1982, p 300)

The time of childhood characterized by omnipotence - a kind

of control without choice - is paradoxically both easily

shattered by a sense of helplessness and, if that sense of

helplessness is too pervasive, will prolong this time and rein-

force the immature belief in omnipotent causality (blame,

according to Hoffman, and omnipotent culpability, according

to Fairbairn). It is the assumption of this present thesis

that the prolongation and vestiges of this omnipotent period

form the principal components for what is later identified as

the clinical manifestations of pathological loyalty - guilt and

pathogenic identifications. Hoffman cites evidence to substan-

tiate the assumption that the guilt response is prolonged

if one is not able to proceed with reparative action. (1982)

Somewhat later, around two to three years of age, children

in their development become aware of the true impact of their

actions. Once the child begins to be aware that others have

their own inner states they begin to have the cognitive pre-

requisites for guilt over inaction. Once guilt over omission

or inaction is achieved, guilt may become a part of all subse-

quent responses to another's distress, at least in situations

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in which one could have helped but did not.

That form of guilt which is founded upon the most compli-
cated of cognitive processes in what Hoffman calls existential
guilt, a sense of culpability upon the realization of the
vast differences in well-being between the self and other.
Survivor guilt is a manifestation of existential guilt -
where a person feels responsible because of circumstances
beyond his control. This form of guilt has some of the
quality of guilt due to omission or inaction.

Hoffman suggests that there may be little conflict
between empathic and egoistic socialization in early child-
hood, a tenet which has earlier in this paper been suggested.
At some point, however, empathic and egoistic motivation
begin to clash, says Hoffman. This is particularly
true in our highly "individualistic" society of today. And,
according to anthropological data of more ethnically cohesive,
less ideologically pluralistic cultures wherein individual-
ism is not so emphasized, indeed, not even conceptualized,
(e.g., the Vietnamese language, similar to other Oriental
languages, has no word for self-referencing other than in
relation to another) this schism between pro-social,
altruistic motivation and egoistic motivation could not even
exist.

In summation, Hoffman's theory and data suggest that empathy and guilt have (1.) a cognitive and affective component,(2.) developing through distinctly different processes, (3.) yet, experienced as a fusion, (4.) the effect of which is to provide a motivational disposition toward pro-social action.

According to Hoffman, (1982, p 310) although pro-social behavior motivated by empathy and guilt may explain <u>why</u> people act morally and feel bad when they harm someone, this theory by itself cannot explain how children learn to negotiate and achieve a balance between the altruistic motives and the egoistic motives that may be aroused in particular situations. One's empathic proclivities may make one more receptive to certain moral values, but empathy alone cannot explain how people formulate complex moral ideologies and apply them in situations. Perhaps, one's empathic proclivities may make one more receptive to social values which are founded upon moral values that in part are founded upon an altruistic instinct in much the same way as a child's capacity for language development allows the child to learn a particlar language. Without a universal moral principle, it becomes imperative to investigate connections between empathy and particular moral principles having con- sensus in particular societies in order to ascertain an individual's motivation. It may be reasonable to

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expect empathy to develop into a motive for action in accord with the perceived welfare of others, and furthermore, to expect this motive to acquire both an unconscious and conscious obligatory quality through binding social principles. These principles, then, are used to guide one's own actions as well as to judge the behavior of others.

What has been presented is a theoretical model of empathic arousal, its developmental course, its transformation into guilt and its implications for altruistic motivation and moral action.

What remains still to be presented is a translation of these data and theoretical formulations into a clinical under-standing and guidelines for treating those individuals suffer-ing from pathological guilt based upon instinctually based but immaturely perceived and poorly constructed beliefs and moral values. We must come to better understand in the clinical setting an individual's deeply felt connections linking guilt and loyalty and morality.

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CHAPTER   V

Toward an integration of clinical
theories based upon the dialectic
of instincts: egoism and altruism.

The intent of Chapter V is the integration of the various psychoanalytic theories already presented and some still to be presented into a consistent psychodynamic theoretical model through an understanding of a basic dialectic instinct theory: autonomy cannot exist without relatedness and that each utilizes the instinctual interplay between egoism and altruism. The literature on pre-oedipal guilt, particularly the work of Friedman, Sampson, and Weiss is summarized here. To briefly recount, what object relationists call pre-oedipal guilt, Friedman separates into super-ego anxiety and guilt. Loyalty to pathogenic parental identifications based upon one's guilt contains a factor of unconscious motivational force founded upon one's instinctual capacity for altruism.

The interplay between altruism and egoism is posited as an augmentation to object relations theory and those theories supporting unconsicous guilt and unconscious use of higher mental functions, for example, choice. Pathology may be viewed as arising out of some instinctually based conflict between one's own needs and the needs of others as these needs are perceived by the individual. This is the conflict to which Hoffman refers when he speaks of the eventual clash between empathic and egoistic motivation that occurs with children, particularly in societies stressing individualism. (Hoffman, 1982, p 310)

This motivational conflict is experienced in all the many

varieties of neurotic and psychotic behavior and ideations

in the general pattern of conscious or unconscious anxiety,

creating defense, which is regulated by unconscious guilt

and all its many congitive and affective variations. What

follows, then, are any number of disturbances which might

occur, disturbances in conscience, empathy, relatedness,

self-esteem, as well as an excessive dependence upon the

environment for any sense of self fulfillment. The indivi-

dual is left with a rigidly perceived sense of self and view

of the world as always separate from or always fused with

the needs and goals of others as they are perceived by the

self.

Pathology is said to occur when this motivational inter-

play breaks down when an individual consistently and

traumatically perceives or believes his own needs and desires

are either fused with or separate from those of others (as

suggested by Michael Friedman, 1985). Consistent with a

theory founded upon altruism and egoism as equal motivational

factors is an understanding of what therapy might be. Therapy,

in this case, is not simply uncovering egoistic and infantile

drives, but rather, of locating the sources of the pathologi-

cal unconscious guilt in the early unconscious beliefs and

perceptions of the individual. Most often these perceptions

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and beliefs predate the cognitive maturation of the individual, and are representative of that transitional period of development characterized by omnipotent causality, that is, cause without choice. It is a time when empathy is not yet fully integrated and mediated by cognition. What happens in the clinical manifestations of guilt are an apparent schism between autonomous drive and relatedness in which the child comes to sense that his own natural drive toward autonomy (which is, here, not equatable to individualism), with its main thrust from egoistic impulses will destroy or damage those close to him. Out of regard for their welfare, the child is willing to sacrifice some aspects of his developing autonomy. His sense of loyalty is propelled for the most part from pro-social instincts. In some cases this clash of motivational forces (egoism and altruism) that compels the child to sacrifice the practice of his autonomous functioning allows for his egoism to become invested in preserving the belief in his omnipotent control of the parent's illness, happiness, health, and desire. The obvious though fragile sense of omnipotence upon which the child views the world and his actions provides a sense of ego fulfillment for the child. In addition, the child receives ego satisfaction from the reinforcement from his parents for his devotion to them and protection from his

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fear of losing their love should he no longer be devoted.

In other words, a child who unconsciously believes that if he becomes more independent of his parents, he will damage them, may consciously enjoy his dependence on them. Some pathogenic beliefs of childhood, which usually stem from the transitional cognitive and affective stage characterized by omnipotence, are easily or at least more easily shattered by fresh experiences of reality and are consequently relinquished. This state of affairs is part of "the normal growing pains" of childhood according to Joseph Weiss (1986, p 70).

The apparent vigilance and reinforcement by the parent(s) only serve to confirm the child's belief that even a slight attempt at independence from them will only damage them. Even new experiences, in this case, with different people from his parents, will be viewed by the child from the vantage of vestigal omnipotence, that is, he will continue to perceive the "cues" from another that his independent action will hurt another. The child cannot readily make observations contrary to his belief and will, therefore, have difficulty acting upon stimuli that are contrary to the omnipotent but guilt reinforcing belief. For various and many reasons a particular pathogenic belief will be maintained by the individual into adulthood, perhaps

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unfortunately, for a lifetime if some conscious intervention is not applied. In psychotherapy, of course, that consciousness is initially provided by the therapeutic situation and the therapist.

Pathogenic unconscious beliefs are false and maladaptive. They are produced by the child as part of his effort at adaptation. They are attempts, as Weiss says (1986, p 70), by the ego to understand the dangers of the world and by so understanding them to avoid them. Pathogenic beliefs are distinguishable from id fantasies. Although both are basically unconscious processes, they are different in two ways:

1. pathogenic beliefs are mediated by higher cognitive functions and are attempts at explaining reality including painful, traumatic, and empathically distressful experiences; the id by definition cannot produce a pathogenic belief as it is regulated solely by the pleasure principle and, thus, avoids automatically all painful experiences - it certainly could not, then, form beliefs to explain them. The work of Sampson, Weiss (1986), and Bush (1984) have clearly distinguished the two.

2. pathogenic beliefs are composed of the interplay of two motivational factors, (a) egoistic, and (2) altruistic. Although the work of Sampson, Weiss (1986), Bush (1984)

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often make mention of motivational factors stemming from an altruistic instinct, they clearly do not acknowledge or develop such in their work. The present work attempts to explain this process.

The work of Harold Sampson and Joseph Weiss is primarily an extensive analysis of the course of psychotherapy utilizing the hypothesis of unconscious "higher mental functioning". Their recent work, The Psychoanalytic Process, is a cogent presentation of this theory. According to the higher mental functioning hypothesis:

    1. a person is able unconsciously to exert some control over his behavior;

    2. he regulates it unconsciously in accordance with thoughts, beliefs, and assessments of current reality;

    3. he attempts by his regulation of behavior to avoid putting himself in dangerous situations. (Weiss, 1986)

A person, according to this hypothesis, exerts unconscious control over not only his repressions (impulses), but over other unconscious behavior as well. These behaviors are regulated by unconscious beliefs. As an example of such a belief, one to which Freud often alluded, is the male's belief that if he maintains sexual interest in his mother, he will be punitively castrated by his father. In this theory of higher mental functioning, equally unconscious are

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the process, the material, and the motivation.

Psychopathology is said to exist by way of an individual's obedience to certain unconscious, compelling, grim beliefs that he acquires in early childhood by inferences from experiences, and include centering causality within himself. As a result, these beliefs are ultimately guilt producing, of an irrational and unconscious sort, which, in turn, are an extremely powerful unconscious force in development and behavior.

Unconscious guilt can account for not only anxiety and depression but also,

> "very primitive expressions of drive behavior,
> ... perverse sexual behavior ... psychosomatic
> conditions,...The most flagrant instances of
> sexual and aggressive acting out may be moti-
> vated by unconscious guilt and primarily serv-
> ing the function of self-punishment, rather
> than drive gratification." (Bush, 1984, p 1)

Bush explains that this irrational guilt stems from an unconscious belief that one has done something bad, where doing something bad most fundamentally means doing something hurtful or being disloyal to another person toward whom one feels a special attachment and responsibility, such as, a parent, child, or sibling. This guilt, if we recall from previous chapters, as suggested by Hoffman (Chapter IV) and Friedman (Chapter III), includes both guilt of omission and guilt of commission.

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Of importance to note, throughout the presentation of
the theory of Sampson and Weiss, Bush, et al., is that their
work which forms the foundation of the present thesis,
differs in one significant aspect. Their understanding of
guilt and loyalty, though founded upon what they describe
as genuine love and loyalty to another holds as its major
motivational tenet the health and safety of the ego.
Weiss and Sampson are clearly discussing in this exposition
of unconscious guilt the egoistic motivational component of
unconscious guilt. In other words, the child's love and
concern for the other and his subsequent sense of guilt
over that other's distress signals distress in the child
because he has jeopardized his relationship with the parent,
and thus, has jeopardized his own safety. Obviously, this
is not an irrelevant consideration for the child, particu-
larly the very young child. It is a basic consideration
and a most significant motive for the child's ego and super-
ego formation.

The present thesis augments this understanding of an
egoistic motivation of human behavior with a fuller,
elaborated comprehension of human behavior when egoistic
and altruistic motivational factors are enmeshed. The
child equally fears for his own safety and is genuinely
concerned for the other's welfare. It is important to

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remember that the child's motivational forces are concurrent; neither is causal to the other.

The question arises as to why it is that guilt itself, which stems from pro-social factors and with obvious social and individual merit, whether conscious or unconscious, is at times repressed and denied. There are a number of reasons why pathogenic guilt that often by its nature cannot provide any ordinary circumstances for reparation, comes to be perceived as a great danger to a person's interests. To mention but a few, pathogenic guilt destroys feelings of self-esteem and self-worth, undermines one's confidence in one's own good intentions, and makes one less able to defend oneself in the face of false accusations and unmerited mistreatment. It thereby increases one's vulnerability to being traumatized by real situations in the world. (Weiss, 1986)

It becomes clear considering the great personal destruction wrought by pathogenic guilt why there is such a great need to reduce, avoid, and repress the experience of guilt. However, as Bush says,

> "even though a person's guilt feelings may be
> deeply repressed and strongly denied, they
> still unconsicously exert the most far reaching
> effects on every area of personality functioning.
> It is not unusual for a patient's life to be
> totally dominated by irrational guilt without
> the patient having any awareness of its existence,

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"its origins, and its influence on the patient's behavior." (Bush, 1984, p 5)

As unconscious and pathogenic as some guilt and beliefs are,there exists, equally unconscious, the basic hope of the individual to change those beliefs. In the words of Sampson and Weiss, and the theory which they call Control Mastery theory, the individual when he comes to therapy seeks to "disconfirm" his pathogenic beliefs. This desire for change and for health in the individual exists despite the investment of the ego in its pathology.

Therapy according to Control Mastery theory proceeds according to the unconsicous assessments of the individual as to the safety of lifting those repressions surrounding his guilt and pathogenic beliefs (which, according to the theory, allow for change to occur.) The patient attempts to. disconfirm his beliefs by way of "testing" them in relation to the therapist. He "tests" by the use of certain trial behaviors in the hope of demonstrating that he is not affecting the therapist in ways predicted by his pathogenic beliefs (Weiss, 1986). As an example, a patient may come to accept the fact that the therapist neither wishes, nor needs the patient to sacrifice individual autonomous behavior in order to preserve the therapist. By repeatedly discon- firming a particular pathogenic belief, the patient succeeds in loosening its hold on him; he may begin to lift the

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repressions he had been maintaining and to then experience and express his previously warded off motives for his beliefs. Gradually, the patient becomes both insightful and able to change his perceptions and actions. Thus, the emergence of this previously repressed material is met with relief by the patient, and not with further anxiety as classical psychoanalysis would have it.

Control Mastery theory while acknowledging the essential role of the individual's ties to and love for others, and the motivational role of these ties and love in the formation of the child's(patient's) pathogenic beliefs and subsequent willingness to and actual sacrifice of various aspects of his autonomous functioning, for example, the ability to form meaningful subsequent relationships or to find satisfaction in work,it doesn't explicitly grant separate motivational status to this love. In other words, the individual's love for others is tied to this connection with those significant others based upon a fear of losing them because he is dependent upon them. The child loves because he depends on others. Although the theory does acknowledge that trauma can and does occur beyond the age of dependence as well as involving others on whom one is not dependent, for example, children and relatives of Holocaust victims suffer survivor guilt at any age, it stops short of develop-

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ing a separate but concurrent motivational system of altruism, and maintains, instead, a more traditional egoistic motivation explanation.

However, it is the thesis of this paper that the role of early empathic motivational factors is of essential importance in the development of pathogenic beliefs. Equally important is the understanding of this empathic motivational factor in the treatment of individuals in psychotherapy. These pathogenic beliefs serve as the basis for an unconscious moral code. The child develops his particular morality that he universally applies from his experiences with his parents and from their teachings. The parents' vigilant and most often unconscious reinforcement of the child's beliefs confirm the universality of his morality.

Applying Control Mastery's hypothesis of unconscious higher mental functioning to a logical but not articulated conclusion it would seem that the child, if motivated solely by egoistic impulses, would eventually come to realize that the sacrifice he was making in order to preserve his own safety and ties to his parents was exacting far too great a price in terms of, for example, his self-esteem. That, however, is not the case. The child unconsciously assesses that his sacrifice of autonomy or self-worth is, indeed,

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worthwhile, not out of egoism alone, but through altruism -
the child separately and independently(but simultaneously)
of egoistic motivational factors, fears that his actions
will hurt his parents or siblings and so maintains his course
of sacrifical action long past the time that an egoistic
motivation alone would permit.

In psychotherapy, it is the role of the therapist to tap
into this loyalty, this rigidly construed and held moral
system, before any change in the patient's behavior and
perceptions can occur. Just how might the therapist accom-
plish this? It is through the empathic acknowledgement of
the sacrifice. In so doing, the therapist is acknowledging
the fundamental "naturalness" of the patient's motivation,
and that his reasons for sacrifice are exemplary. In fact,
his altruistic "reasons" are the very essence of what it
is to be human. The individual is not ill because he is
loyal, because he is disposed to act with loyalty toward
those for whom he cares. The individual is ill by way of
his pathogenic beliefs about what loyalty is and how it so
compels him to function in relationship to others. What
much of the work of psychotherapy is, in many instances,
is not the uncovering of egoistic impulses and motivation,
is not the advancement of egoistic impulses over altruistic,
but rather a reintegration of these motivational systems.

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In other words, the patient does not relinquish his loyalty
and ties to his parents or siblings (as if he could).
Rather, it is his implementation of that bond of loyalty
which changes. The patient gives up his self-destructive,
self-abnegating sacrifice, for some more ennobling course
of action. As an example, consider the patient who sacri-
fices his own joy and capacity for relationships, be it with
friends, spouse, or children, in an attempt to protect and
preserve his ties to his depressed and possessive mother
whom he believes might or will perish under light of his
joy and desire in other relationships. The patient must
eventually substitute an equally compelling belief that the
fullness of his living, whether or not it can "save"
his pathological parent, is actually the right, the moral
way to function in his life. In fact, he must come to
believe (consciously or unconsciously) that his self-sacri-
fice though born of loyalty is actually a maintainance of
anti-social, anti-life, immoral action which enables
neither himself nor his mother safety and protection.

Without this regeneration of altruistic and egoistic
motivational factors and their reintegration, therapy will
not be successful. Interestingly, although this reintegration
of the altruistic and egoistic aspects of human motivation
and behavior has not specifically been addressed in either

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the literature or the practice of psychotherapy, both

the therapist and the patient, engaged in a fundamental

human dialogue, unconsciously acknowledge and complete this

essential therapeutic task: to love and to work - to seek

a dynamic balance between one's altruism and egoism.

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